TY  - JOUR
A1  - Kramer, Anja
A1  - Krebs, Vanessa
A1  - Schmidt, Martin
T1  - Strictly and -robust counterparts of electricity market models
T2  - Operations Research Perspectives
N2  - This paper mainly studies two topics: linear complementarity problems for modeling electricity market equilibria and optimization under uncertainty. We consider both perfectly competitive and Nash–Cournot models of electricity markets and study their robustifications using strict robustness and the -approach. For three out of the four combinations of economic competition and robustification, we derive algorithmically tractable convex optimization counterparts that have a clear-cut economic interpretation. In the case of perfect competition, this result corresponds to the two classic welfare theorems, which also apply in both considered robust cases that again yield convex robustified problems. Using the mentioned counterparts, we can also prove the existence and, in some cases, uniqueness of robust equilibria. Surprisingly, it turns out that there is no such economic sensible counterpart for the case of -robustifications of Nash–Cournot models. Thus, an analog of the welfare theorems does not hold in this case. Finally, we provide a computational case study that illustrates the different effects of the combination of economic competition and uncertainty modeling.
KW  - Robust optimization
KW  - Linear complementarity problems
KW  - Electricity market equilibrium models
KW  - Perfect competition
KW  - Nash–Cournot competition
Y1  - 2021
UR  - https://ubt.opus.hbz-nrw.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/1826
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:385-1-18261
VL  - 2021
IS  - Band 8
PB  - Elsevier
CY  - Amsterdam
ER  -