Jonas Andreas Jakobs

• This thesis deals with consumption-investment allocation problems with Epstein-Zin recursive utility, building upon the dualization procedure introduced by [Matoussi and Xing, 2018]. While their work exclusively focuses on truly recursive utility, we extend their procedure to include time-additive utility using results from general convex analysis. The dual problem is expressed in terms of a backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE), for which existence and uniqueness results are established. In this regard, we close a gap left open in previous works, by extending results restricted to specific subsets of parameters to cover all parameter constellations within our duality setting. Using duality theory, we analyze the utility loss of an investor with recursive preferences, that is, her difference in utility between acting suboptimally in a given market, compared to her best possible (optimal) consumption-investment behaviour. In particular, we derive universal power utility bounds, presenting a novel and tractable approximation of the investors’ optimal utility and her welfare loss associated to specific investment-consumption choices. To address quantitative shortcomings of those power utility bounds, we additionally introduce one-sided variational bounds that offer a more effective approximation for recursive utilities. The theoretical value of our power utility bounds is demonstrated through their application in a new existence and uniqueness result for the BSDE characterizing the dual problem. Moreover, we propose two approximation approaches for consumption-investment optimization problems with Epstein-Zin recursive preferences. The first approach directly formalizes the classical concept of least favorable completion, providing an analytic approximation fully characterized by a system of ordinary differential equations. In the special case of power utility, this approach can be interpreted as a variation of the well-known Campbell-Shiller approximation, improving some of its qualitative shortcomings with respect to state dependence of the resulting approximate strategies. The second approach introduces a PDE-iteration scheme, by reinterpreting artificial completion as a dynamic game, where the investor and a dual opponent interact until reaching an equilibrium that corresponds to an approximate solution of the investors optimization problem. Despite the need for additional approximations within each iteration, this scheme is shown to be quantitatively and qualitatively accurate. Moreover, it is capable of approximating high dimensional optimization problems, essentially avoiding the curse of dimensionality and providing analytical results.