Tschechien hat nach deutschem Vorbild ein sehr starkes Verfassungsgericht. Das Gericht besitzt die Kompetenz, nicht nur verfassungswidrige Gesetze aufzuheben, sondern auch alle Entscheidungen anderer Gerichte, wenn sie die Grundrechte verletzen.
Im grundsätzlichen Urteil des Plenums des Verfassungsgerichts Pl. ÚS
27/09 (Nr. 318/2009 Sb., Fall Melčák) hob das Verfassungsgericht
sogar das Verfassungsgesetz über die Verkürzung der fünften Wahlperiode der Abgeordnetenkammer auf. Das Verfassungsgericht stimmte so der Auslegung zu, dass es die Befugnis hat, auch das Verfassungsgesetz aufzuheben, falls dieses eine unzulässige Änderung der wesentlichen Erfordernisse eines demokratischen Rechtsstaats bedeutet (Art. 9 Abs. 2 der Verfassung). Die fünfzehn Richter des Verfassungsgerichts werden vom Präsidenten der Republik mit Zustimmung des Senats auf zehn Jahre ernannt; ein Verfassungsrichter muss mindestens vierzig Jahre alt sein, über eine juristische Ausbildung und eine zehnjährige Praxis verfügen (Art. 84 der Verfassung); Wiederernennung ist möglich und kommt in der Praxis vor. Im Gegensatz zu anderen Verfassungsorganen genießt das Verfassungsgericht das besondere Vertrauen der Öffentlichkeit.
Der Beitrag von Dr. Wintr fasst die wichtigsten Urteile des tschechischen Verfassungsgerichts zusammenfassen.
Although geographically it belongs to Europe, as far as the constitutionality control of the statutory provisions is concerned, Greece follows the American system. That means that there is no Constitutional Court and, on the contrary, every court (even those of first instance) are entitled, and indeed obliged, to control the constitutionality of the laws (Articles 87 par. 2 and 93 par. 4 of the Greek Constitution). The Greek Courts examine only the substantial and not the formal constitutionality of the statutory provisions. If a court comes to the result of the unconstitutionality, then the statutory provision is not annulled and removed from the legal order, but it is not applied by the court in the relevant court procedure. The only – rather rare – case where a statutory provision is erga omnes annulled is when this is ordered by a decision of the Highest Special Court (Article 100 of the Greek Constitution), following a disagreement between two of the three highest Courts, namely between Symvoulio tis Epikrateias (highest Administrative Court), Areios Pagos (Cassations Court in Civil and Criminal procedures) and Elegtiko Synedrio (Court of Audit).
The presentation is going to examine the origins of the Greek system of the constitutionality control. It will also focus on the advantages and disadvantages of the Greek system and on the scientific and political discussion. Last but not least, the presentation will examine the role of the Council of State, which, although formally not a Constitutional Court, in practice issues the vast majority of the court decisions which accept the unconstitutionality of statutory provisions.
Major threats to the Spanish Constitutional Court’s independence and authority have come, first, from political parties and the media and, second, by the Catalonian secession movement. The authority and the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court were tested in the stormy
proceedings on the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia of 2006 that ended in 2010 and, above all, in the period of 2013–2017, when successive acts directed at the secession of were recurrently Catalonia challenged before the Court and subsequently overturned, and to stop the continued disobedience its rulings the of Court was given extended execution powers for its judgments. These new powers include the temporary replacement of any authority or public official that does not comply with a Court’s ruling and the ordering of a substitutive execution through the central government. The Court declared the new powers to be consistent with the Constitution (with three dissenting votes by four constitutional judges) and it even used them for the first time to enforce its prohibition of the referendum on the independence of Catalonia of 1 October 2017. Nevertheless, the Venice Commission has raised doubts about the opportunity of those powers, which are unusual in European constitutional jurisdiction models. At the end, the Court’s powers were not enough to stop the Catalonian secession process, and on 27 October 2017 the state government implemented the federal coercion clause and suspended Catalonian autonomy until new elections were held.