This thesis contains three parts that are all connected by their contribution to research about the effects of trading apps on investment behavior. The primary motivation for this study is to investigate the previously undetermined consequences and effects of trading apps, which are a new phenomenon in the broker market, on the investment and risk behavior of Neobroker users. Chapter 2 addresses the characteristics of a typical Neobroker user and a former Neobroker user and the impact of trading apps on the investment and risk behavior of their users. The results show that Neobroker users are significantly more risk tolerant than the general German population and are influenced by trading apps regarding their investment and risk behavior. Low trading fees and the low minimum investment amount are the main reasons for the use of trading apps. Investors who stop using trading apps mostly stop investing altogether. Another worrying result is that financial literacy among all groups is low and most Neobroker users have wrong conceptions about how trading apps earn money. In general, the financial literacy of all groups considered in this chapter is surprisingly low. The third chapter investigates the effects of trading apps on investment behavior over time and compares the investment and risk behavior of Neobroker users and general investors. By using representative data of German Neobroker users, who were surveyed repeatedly over a 8-month time interval, it becomes possible to determine causal effects of the use of trading apps over time. In total, the financial literacy of Neobroker users increases with the longer use of a trading app. A worrying result is that the risk tolerance of Neobroker users rises significantly over time. Male Neobroker users gain a higher annual return (non-risk-adjusted) than female Neobroker users. In comparison to general investors, Neobroker users are significantly younger, more risk tolerant, more likely to buy derivatives and gain a higher annual return (non-risk-adjusted). The fourth chapter analyses the impact of personality traits on the investment and risk behavior of Neobroker users. The results show that the BIG-5 personality traits have an impact on the investment behavior of Neobroker users. Two personality traits, openness and conscientiousness, stand out the most, as these two have explanatory power over various aspects of the behavior of Neobroker users. In particular, whether they buy different financial products than planned, the time they inform themselves about financial markets, the variety of financial products owned, and the reasons to use a Neobroker. Surprisingly, the risk tolerance of Neobroker users and the reasons to invest are not connected to any personal dimension. Whether a participant uses a trading app or a traditional broker to invest is respectively influenced by different personality traits.

In machine learning, classification is the task of predicting a label for each point within a data set. When the class of each point in the labeled subset is already known, this information is used to recognize patterns and make predictions about the points in the remainder of the set, referred to as the unlabeled set. This scenario falls in the field of supervised learning. However, the number of labeled points can be restricted, because, e.g., it is expensive to obtain this information. Besides, this subset may be biased, such as in the case of self-selection in a survey. Consequently, the classification performance for unlabeled points may be limited. To improve the reliability of the results, semi-supervised learning tackles the setting of labeled and unlabeled data. Moreover, in many cases, additional information about the size of each class can be available from undisclosed sources. This cumulative thesis presents different studies to combine this external cardinality constraint information within three important algorithms for binary classification in the supervised context: support vector machines (SVM), classification trees, and random forests. From a mathematical point of view, we focus on mixed-integer programming (MIP) models for semi-supervised approaches that consider a cardinality constraint for each class for each algorithm. Furthermore, since the proposed MIP models are computationally challenging, we also present techniques that simplify the process of solving these problems. In the SVM setting, we introduce a re-clustering method and further computational techniques to reduce the computational cost. In the context of classification trees, we provide correct values for certain bounds that play a crucial role for the solver performance. For the random forest model, we develop preprocessing techniques and an intuitive branching rule to reduce the solution time. For all three methods, our numerical results show that our approaches have better statistical performances for biased samples than the standard approach.

The positive consequences of performance pay on the wages and productivity have been well documented in the last decades. Yet, the increased pressure and work commitment associated with performance pay suggest that performance pay may have unintended negative consequences on worker’s health and well-being. As firms increasingly use performance pay worldwide, it becomes crucial to evaluate positive and negative consequences of performance pay. Thus, Chapters 2 – 4 of this doctoral thesis investigate the unintended adverse consequences of performance pay on stress, alcohol consumption, and loneliness, respectively. Chapter 5 investigates the positive role of performance pay on mitigating the overeducation wage penalty and enhancing labor market position of overeducated workers. In Chapter 2, together with John S. Heywood and Uwe Jirjahn, I examine the hypothesis that performance pay is positively associated with employee stress. Using unique survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, I find performance pay consistently and importantly associates with greater stress even controlling for a long list of economic, social, and personality characteristics. The finding also holds in instrumental variable estimations accounting for the potential endogeneity of performance pay. Moreover, I show that risk tolerance and locus of control moderate the relationship between performance pay and stress. Among workers receiving performance pay, the risk tolerant and those believing they can control their environment suffer to a lesser degree from stress. Chapter 3 examines the relationship between performance pay and alcohol use. Together with John S. Heywood and Uwe Jirjahn, I examine the hypothesis that alcohol use as “self-medication” is a natural response to the stress and uncertainty associated with performance pay. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, I find that the likelihood of consuming each of four types of alcohol (beer, wine, spirits, and mixed drinks) is higher for those receiving performance pay even controlling for a long list of economic, social, and personality characteristics and in sensible instrumental variable estimates. I also show that the number of types of alcohol consumed is larger for those receiving performance pay and that the intensity of consumption increases. Moreover, I find that risk tolerance and gender moderate the relationship between performance pay and alcohol use. In Chapter 4, I examine the hypothesis that performance pay increases the risk of employee loneliness due to increased stress, job commitment, and uncooperativeness associated with performance pay. Using the German Socio-Economic Panel, I find that performance pay is positively associated with both the incidence and intensity of loneliness. Correspondingly, performance pay decreases the social life satisfaction of workers. The findings also hold in instrumental variable estimations addressing the potential endogeneity of performance pay and in various robustness checks. Interestingly, investigating the potential role of moderating factors reveals that the association between performance pay and loneliness is particularly large for private sector employees. Finally, in Chapter 5, I study the association between overeducation, performance pay, and wages. Overeducated workers are more productive and have higher wages in comparison to their adequately educated coworkers in the same jobs. However, they face a series of challenges in the labor market, including lower wages in comparison to their similarly educated peers who are in correctly matched jobs. Yet, less consensus exists over the adjustment mechanisms to overcome the negative consequences of overeducation. In this study, I examine the hypotheses that overeducated workers sort into performance pay jobs as an adjustment mechanism and that performance pay enhances their wages. Using the German Socio-Economic Panel, I show that overeducation associates with a higher likelihood of sorting into performance pay jobs and that performance pay moderates the wages of overeducated workers positively. It also holds in endogenous switching regressions accounting for the potential endogeneity of performance pay. Importantly, I show that the positive role of performance pay is particularly larger for the wages of overeducated women.

This thesis explores local and global normal and Edgeworth approximations for symmetric binomial distributions. Further, it examines the normal approximation of convolution powers of continuous and discrete uniform distributions. We obtain the optimal constant in the local central limit theorem for symmetric binomial distributions and its analogs in higher-order Edgeworth approximation. Further, we offer a novel proof for the known optimal constant in the global central limit theorem for symmetric binomial distributions using Fourier inversion. We also consider the effect of simple continuity correction in the global central limit theorem for symmetric binomial distributions. Here, and in higher-order Edgeworth approximation, we found optimal constants and asymptotically sharp bounds on the approximation error. Furthermore, we prove asymptotically sharp bounds on the error in the local case of a relative normal approximation to symmetric binomial distributions. Additionally, we provide asymptotically sharp bounds on the approximation error in the local central limit theorem for convolution powers of continuous and discrete uniform distributions. Our methods include Fourier inversion formulae, explicit inequalities, and Edgeworth expansions, some of which may be of independent interest.

This thesis consists of four highly related chapters examining China’s rise in the aluminium industry. The first chapter addresses the conditions that allowed China, which first entered the market in the 1950s, to rise to world leadership in aluminium production. Although China was a latecomer, its re-entry into the market after the oil crises in the 1970s was a success and led to its ascent as the world’s largest aluminium producer by 2001. With an estimated production of 40.4 million tonnes in 2022, China represented almost 60% of the global output. Chapter 1 examines the factors underlying this success, such as the decline of international aluminium cartels, the introduction of innovative technology, the US granting China the MFN tariff status, Chinese-specific factors, and supportive government policies. Chapter 2 develops a mathematical model to analyze firms’ decisions in the short term. It examines how an incumbent with outdated technology and a new entrant with access to a new type of technology make strategic decisions, including the incumbent’s decision whether to deter entry, the production choice of firms, the optimal technology adoption rate of the newcomer, and cartel formation. Chapter 3 focuses on the adoption of new technology by firms upon market entry in four scenarios: firstly, a free market Cournot competition; secondly, a situation in which the government determines technology adoption rates; thirdly, a scenario in which the government controls both technology and production; and finally, a scenario where the government dictates technology adoption rates, production levels, and also the number of market participants. Chapter 4 applies the Spencer and Brander (1983) framework to examine strategic industrial policy. The model assumes that there are two exporting firms in two different countries that sell a product to a third country. We examine how the domestic firm is influenced by government intervention, such as the provision of a fixed-cost subsidy to improve its competitiveness relative to the foreign company. Chapter 4 initially investigates a scenario where only one government offers a fixed-cost subsidy, followed by an analysis of the case when both governments simultaneously provide financial help. Taken together, these chapters provide a comprehensive analysis of the strategic, technological, and political factors contributing to China’s leadership in the global aluminium industry. Chapter 1: The Rise of China as a Latecomer in the Global Aluminium Industry This chapter examines China’s remarkable transformation into a global leader in the aluminium industry, a sector in which the country accounted for approximately 58.9% of worldwide production in 2022. We examine how China, a latecomer to the aluminium industry that started off with labor-intensive technology in 1953, grew into the largest aluminium producer with some of the most advanced smelters in the world. This analysis identifies and discusses several opportunities that Chinese aluminium producers took advantage of. The first set of opportunities happened during the 1970s oil crises, which softened international competition and allowed China to acquire innovative smelting technology from Japan. The second set of opportunities started at about the same time when China opened its economy in 1978. The substantial demand for aluminium in China is influenced by both external and internal factors. Externally, the US granted China’s MFN tariff status in 1980 and China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Both events contributed to a surge in Chinese aluminium consumption. Internally, China’s investment-led growth model boosted further its aluminium demand. Additional factors specific to China, such as low labor costs and the abundance of coal as an energy source, offer Chinese firms competitive advantages against international players. Furthermore, another window of opportunity is due to Chinese governmental policies, including phasing out old technology, providing subsidies, and gradually opening the economy to enhance domestic competition before expanding globally. By describing these elements, the study provides insights into the dynamic interplay of external circumstances and internal strategies that contributed to the success of the Chinese aluminium industry. Chapter 2: Technological Change and Strategic Choices for Incumbent and New Entrant This chapter introduces an oligopoly model that includes two actors: an incumbent and a potential entrant, that compete in the same market. We assume that two participants are located in different parts of the market: the incumbent is situated in area 1, whereas the potential entrant may venture into the other region, area 2. The incumbent exists in stage zero, where it can decide whether to deter the newcomer’s entry. A new type of technology exists in period one, when the newcomer may enter the market. In the short term, the incumbent is trapped with the outdated technology, while the new entrant may choose to partially or completely adopt the latest technology. Our results suggest the following: Firstly, the incumbent only tries to deter the new entrant if a condition for entry cost is met. Secondly, the new entrant is only interested in forming a cartel with the incumbent if a function of the ratio of the variable to new technology’s fixed-cost parameters is sufficiently high. Thirdly, if the newcomer asks to form a cartel, the incumbent will always accept this request. Finally, we can obtain the optimal new technology adoption rate for the newcomer. Chapter 3: Technological Adoption and Welfare in Cournot Oligopoly This study examines the difference between the optimal technology adoption rates chosen by firms in a homogeneous Cournot oligopoly and that preferred by a benevolent government upon firms’ market entry. To address the question of whether the technology choices of firms and government are similar, we analyze several different scenarios, which differ in the extent of government intervention in the market. Our results suggest a relationship between the number of firms in the market and the impact of government intervention on technology adoption rates. Especially in situations with a low number of firms that are interested in entering the market, greater government influence tends to lead to higher technology adoption rates of firms. Conversely, in scenarios with a higher number of firms and a government that lacks control over the number of market players, the technology adoption rate of firms will be highest when the government plays no role. Chapter 4: International Technological Innovation and Industrial Strategies Supporting domestic firms when they first enter the market may be seen as a favorable policy choice by governments around the world thanks to their ability to enhance the competitive advantage of domestic firms in non-cooperative competition against foreign enterprises (infant industry protection argument). This advantage may allow domestic firms to increase their market share and generate higher profits, thereby improving domestic welfare. This chapter utilizes the Spencer and Brander (1983) framework as a theoretical foundation to elucidate the effects of fixed-cost subsidies on firms’ production levels, technological innovations, and social welfare. The analysis examines two firms in different countries, each producing a homogeneous product that is sold in a third, separate country. We first examine the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the absence of government intervention, followed by analyzing a scenario where just one government provides a financial subsidy for its domestic firm, and finally, we consider a situation where both governments simultaneously provide financial assistance for their respective firms. Our results suggest that governments aim to maximize social welfare by providing fixed-cost subsidies to their respective firms, finding themselves in a Chicken game scenario. Regarding technology innovation, subsidies lead to an increased technological adoption rate for recipient firms, regardless of whether one or both firms in a market receive support, compared to the situation without subsidies. The technology adoption rate of the recipient firm is higher than of its rival when only the recipient firm benefits from the fixed-cost subsidy. The lowest technology adoption rate of a firm occurs when the firm does not receive a fixed-cost subsidy, but its competitor does. Furthermore, global welfare will benefit the most in case when both exporting countries grant fixed-cost subsidies, and this welfare level is higher when only one country subsidizes than when no subsidies are provided by any country.