This thesis contains three parts that are all connected by their contribution to research about the effects of trading apps on investment behavior. The primary motivation for this study is to investigate the previously undetermined consequences and effects of trading apps, which are a new phenomenon in the broker market, on the investment and risk behavior of Neobroker users. Chapter 2 addresses the characteristics of a typical Neobroker user and a former Neobroker user and the impact of trading apps on the investment and risk behavior of their users. The results show that Neobroker users are significantly more risk tolerant than the general German population and are influenced by trading apps regarding their investment and risk behavior. Low trading fees and the low minimum investment amount are the main reasons for the use of trading apps. Investors who stop using trading apps mostly stop investing altogether. Another worrying result is that financial literacy among all groups is low and most Neobroker users have wrong conceptions about how trading apps earn money. In general, the financial literacy of all groups considered in this chapter is surprisingly low. The third chapter investigates the effects of trading apps on investment behavior over time and compares the investment and risk behavior of Neobroker users and general investors. By using representative data of German Neobroker users, who were surveyed repeatedly over a 8-month time interval, it becomes possible to determine causal effects of the use of trading apps over time. In total, the financial literacy of Neobroker users increases with the longer use of a trading app. A worrying result is that the risk tolerance of Neobroker users rises significantly over time. Male Neobroker users gain a higher annual return (non-risk-adjusted) than female Neobroker users. In comparison to general investors, Neobroker users are significantly younger, more risk tolerant, more likely to buy derivatives and gain a higher annual return (non-risk-adjusted). The fourth chapter analyses the impact of personality traits on the investment and risk behavior of Neobroker users. The results show that the BIG-5 personality traits have an impact on the investment behavior of Neobroker users. Two personality traits, openness and conscientiousness, stand out the most, as these two have explanatory power over various aspects of the behavior of Neobroker users. In particular, whether they buy different financial products than planned, the time they inform themselves about financial markets, the variety of financial products owned, and the reasons to use a Neobroker. Surprisingly, the risk tolerance of Neobroker users and the reasons to invest are not connected to any personal dimension. Whether a participant uses a trading app or a traditional broker to invest is respectively influenced by different personality traits.

Die Hauptzielsetzung der vorliegenden Arbeit besteht in der Erarbeitung von Möglichkeiten zur Optimierung der Bewirtschaftung der Riveristalsperre. Dazu werden zunächst alle relevanten Einflussgrößen und Gefahrenpotentiale des Systems aus dem Einzugsgebiet und der Talsperre analysiert und bewertet. Letztlich wird die Konzeption eines integrierten Bewirtschaftungsplanes für die Riveristalsperre auf der Basis einer neuen Pilotierungsanlage im SWT-Wasserwerk in Trier-Irsch dargestellt, diskutiert und auf Funktionsfähigkeit geprüft. Mit einer aus ca. 90% des Einzugsgebiets bestehenden Waldfläche ist die Hauptsperre der Riveristalsperre durchschnittlich als eindeutig oligotroph eingestuft und das Rohwasser der Riveristalsperre von ausgezeichneter Qualität mit nur wenigen und beherrschbaren Gefahrenpotentialen. Unter Berücksichtigung der Pilotierungsergebnisse war die In/Out, PES, UF- geeigneter als die Out/In, PVDF-Membran. Die Anordnung der UF-Anlage auf der Rohwasserseite nach der Flockung für die Abtrennung der partikulären Wasserinhaltsstoffe mit einer nachgeschalteten Wasseraufhärtung, pH-Wert-Anhebung und Entmanganung in einer CaCO3-Filterstufe und abschließenden Desinfektion durch eine UV-Bestrahlung stellte sich als ideal für die Aufbereitung des Rohwassers der Riveristalsperre heraus. Die Ergebnisse der Pilotanlage sind in einer großtechnischen Trinkwasseraufbereitung im Wasserwerk in Trier-Irsch umgesetzt und seit 2013 offiziell in Betrieb genommen. Abschließend werden Maßnahmen gegen eventuelle Minderwassermengen bei z.B. langanhaltenden Trockenwetterperioden (Klimawandel !) und für die allgemeine Erhöhung der Versorgungssicherheit diskutiert, wobei in Trier und in der Region schon seit langem sehr stark in die Verbundnetzsysteme investiert wird.

Information in der vorvertraglichen Phase – das heißt, Informationspflichten sowie Rechtsfolgen von Informationserteilung und -nichterteilung – in Bezug auf Kaufvertrag und Wahl des optionalen Instruments hat im Vorschlag der Europäischen Kommission für ein Gemeinsames Europäisches Kaufrecht (GEK; KOM(2011) 635) vielfältige Regelungen erfahren. Die vorliegende Arbeit betrachtet diese Regelungen auch in ihrem Verhältnis zu den Textstufen des Europäischen Privatrechts – Modellregeln und verbraucherschützende EU-Richtlinien – und misst sie an ökonomischen Rahmenbedingungen, die die Effizienz von Transaktionen gebieten und Grenzen des Nutzens von (Pflicht-)Informationen aufzeigen. Vom Grundsatz der Vertragsfreiheit ausgehend ist jeder Partei das Risiko zugewiesen, unzureichend informiert zu sein, während die Gegenseite nur punktuell zur Information verpflichtet ist. Zwischen Unternehmern bleibt es auch nach dem GEK hierbei, doch zwischen Unternehmer und Verbraucher wird dieses Verhältnis umgekehrt. Dort gelten, mit Differenzierung nach Vertragsschlusssituationen, umfassende Kataloge von Informationspflichten hinsichtlich des Kaufvertrags. Als Konzept ist dies grundsätzlich sinnvoll; die Pflichten dienen dem Verbraucherschutz, insbesondere der Informiertheit und Transparenz vor der Entscheidung über den Vertragsschluss. Teilweise gehen die Pflichten aber zu weit. Die Beeinträchtigung der Vertragsfreiheit des Unternehmers durch die Pflichten und die Folgen ihrer Verletzung lässt sich nicht vollständig mit dem Ziel des Verbraucherschutzes rechtfertigen. Durch das Übermaß an Information fördern die angeordneten Pflichten den Verbraucherschutz nur eingeschränkt; sie genügen nicht verhaltensökonomischen Maßstäben. Es empfiehlt sich daher, zwischen Unternehmern und Verbrauchern bestimmte verpflichtende Informationsinhalte ganz zu streichen, auf im konkreten Fall nicht erforderliche Information zu verzichten, erst nach Vertragsschluss relevante Informationen auf diese Zeit zu verschieben und die verbleibenden vorvertraglichen Pflichtinformationen in einer für den Verbraucher besser zu verarbeitenden Weise zu präsentieren. Von den einem Verbraucher zu erteilenden Informationen sollte stets verlangt werden, dass sie klar und verständlich sind; die Beweislast für ihre ordnungsgemäße Erteilung sollte generell dem Unternehmer obliegen. Neben die ausdrücklich angeordneten Informationspflichten treten ungeachtet der Verbraucher- oder Unternehmereigenschaft sowie der Käufer- oder Verkäuferrolle stark einzelfallabhängige Informationspflichten nach Treu und Glauben, die im Recht der Willensmängel niedergelegt sind. Hier ist der Grundsatz verwirklicht, dass mangelnde Information zunächst das eigene Risiko jeder Partei ist; berechtigtes Vertrauen und freie Willensbildung werden geschützt. Diese Pflichten berücksichtigen auch das Ziel der Effizienz und achten die Vertragsfreiheit. Das Vertrauen auf jegliche erteilten Informationen wird zudem dadurch geschützt, dass sie den Vertragsinhalt – allerdings in Verbraucherverträgen nicht umfassend genug – mitbestimmen können und dass ihre Unrichtigkeit sanktioniert wird. Die Verletzung jeglicher Arten von Informationspflichten kann insbesondere einen Schadensersatzanspruch sowie – über das Recht der Willensmängel – die Möglichkeit zur Lösung vom Vertrag nach sich ziehen. Das Zusammenspiel der unterschiedlichen Mechanismen führt allerdings zu Friktionen sowie zu Lücken in den Rechtsfolgen von Informationspflichtverletzungen. Daher empfiehlt sich die Schaffung eines Schadensersatzanspruchs für jede treuwidrig unterlassene Informationserteilung; hierdurch wird das Gebot von Treu und Glauben auch außerhalb des Rechts der Willensmängel zu einer eigentlichen einzelfallabhängigen Informationspflicht aufgewertet.

Today, almost every modern computing device is equipped with multicore processors capable of efficient concurrent and parallel execution of threads. This processor feature can be leveraged by concurrent programming, which is a challenge for software developers for two reasons: first, it introduces a paradigm shift that requires a new way of thinking. Second, it can lead to issues that are unique to concurrent programs due to the non-deterministic, interleaved execution of threads. Consequently, the debugging of concurrency and related performance issues is a rather difficult and often tedious task. Developers still lack on thread-aware programming tools that facilitate the understanding of concurrent programs. Ideally, these tools should be part of their daily working environment, which typically includes an Integrated Development Environment (IDE). In particular, the way source code is visually presented in traditional source-code editors does not convey much information on whether the source code is executed concurrently or in parallel in the first place. With this dissertation, we pursue the main goal of facilitating and supporting the understanding and debugging of concurrent programs. To this end, we formulate and utilize a visualization paradigm that particularly includes the display of interactive glyph-based visualizations embedded in the source-code editor close to their corresponding artifacts (in-situ). To facilitate the implementation of visualizations that comply with our paradigm as plugins for IDEs, we designed, implemented and evaluated a programming framework called CodeSparks. After presenting the design goals and the architecture of the framework, we demonstrate its versatility with a total of fourteen plugins realized by different developers using the CodeSparks framework (CodeSparks plugins). With focus group interviews, we empirically investigated how developers of the CodeSparks plugins experienced working with the framework. Based on the plugins, deliberate design decisions and the interview results, we discuss to what extent we achieved our design goals. We found that the framework is largely target programming-language independent and that it supports the development of plugins for a wide range of source-code-related tasks while hiding most of the details of the underlying plugin development API. In addition, we applied our visualization paradigm to thread-related runtime data from concurrent programs to foster the awareness of source code being executed concurrently or in parallel. As a result, we developed and designed two in-situ thread visualizations, namely ThreadRadar and ThreadFork, with the latter building on the former. Both thread visualizations are based on a debugging approach, which combines statistical profiling, thread-aware runtime metrics, clustering of threads on the basis of these metrics, and finally interactive glyph-based in-situ visualizations. To address scalability issues of the ThreadRadar in terms of space required and the number of displayable thread clusters, we designed a revised thread visualization. This revision also involved the question of how many thread clusters k should be computed in the first place. To this end, we conducted experiments with the clustering of threads for artifacts from a corpus of concurrent Java programs that include real-world Java applications and concurrency bugs. We found that the maximum k on the one hand and the optimal k according to four cluster validation indices on the other hand rarely exceed three. However, occasionally thread clusterings with k > 3 are available and also optimal. Consequently, we revised both the clustering strategy and the visualization as parts of our debugging approach, which resulted in the ThreadFork visualization. Both in-situ thread visualizations, including their additional features that support the exploration of the thread data, are implemented in a tool called CodeSparks-JPT, i.e., as a CodeSparks plugin for IntelliJ IDEA. With various empirical studies, including anecdotal usage scenarios, a usability test, web surveys, hands-on sessions, questionnaires and interviews, we investigated quality aspects of the in-situ thread visualizations and their corresponding tools. First, by a demonstration study, we illustrated the usefulness of the ThreadRadar visualization in investigating and fixing concurrency bugs and a performance bug. This was confirmed by a subsequent usability test and interview, which also provided formative feedback. Second, we investigated the interpretability and readability of the ThreadFork glyphs as well as the effectiveness of the ThreadFork visualization through anonymous web surveys. While we have found that the ThreadFork glyphs are correctly interpreted and readable, it remains unproven that the ThreadFork visualization effectively facilitates understanding the dynamic behavior of threads that concurrently executed portions of source code. Moreover, the overall usability of CodeSparks-JPT is perceived as "OK, but not acceptable" as the tool has issues with its learnability and memorability. However, all other usability aspects of CodeSparks-JPT that were examined are perceived as "above average" or "good". Our work supports software-engineering researchers and practitioners in flexibly and swiftly developing novel glyph-based visualizations that are embedded in the source-code editor. Moreover, we provide in-situ thread visualizations that foster the awareness of source code being executed concurrently or in parallel. These in-situ thread visualizations can, for instance, be adapted, extended and used to analyze other use cases or to replicate the results. Through empirical studies, we have gradually shaped the design of the in-situ thread visualizations through data-driven decisions, and evaluated several quality aspects of the in-situ thread visualizations and the corresponding tools for their utility in understanding and debugging concurrent programs.

This thesis consists of four highly related chapters examining China’s rise in the aluminium industry. The first chapter addresses the conditions that allowed China, which first entered the market in the 1950s, to rise to world leadership in aluminium production. Although China was a latecomer, its re-entry into the market after the oil crises in the 1970s was a success and led to its ascent as the world’s largest aluminium producer by 2001. With an estimated production of 40.4 million tonnes in 2022, China represented almost 60% of the global output. Chapter 1 examines the factors underlying this success, such as the decline of international aluminium cartels, the introduction of innovative technology, the US granting China the MFN tariff status, Chinese-specific factors, and supportive government policies. Chapter 2 develops a mathematical model to analyze firms’ decisions in the short term. It examines how an incumbent with outdated technology and a new entrant with access to a new type of technology make strategic decisions, including the incumbent’s decision whether to deter entry, the production choice of firms, the optimal technology adoption rate of the newcomer, and cartel formation. Chapter 3 focuses on the adoption of new technology by firms upon market entry in four scenarios: firstly, a free market Cournot competition; secondly, a situation in which the government determines technology adoption rates; thirdly, a scenario in which the government controls both technology and production; and finally, a scenario where the government dictates technology adoption rates, production levels, and also the number of market participants. Chapter 4 applies the Spencer and Brander (1983) framework to examine strategic industrial policy. The model assumes that there are two exporting firms in two different countries that sell a product to a third country. We examine how the domestic firm is influenced by government intervention, such as the provision of a fixed-cost subsidy to improve its competitiveness relative to the foreign company. Chapter 4 initially investigates a scenario where only one government offers a fixed-cost subsidy, followed by an analysis of the case when both governments simultaneously provide financial help. Taken together, these chapters provide a comprehensive analysis of the strategic, technological, and political factors contributing to China’s leadership in the global aluminium industry. Chapter 1: The Rise of China as a Latecomer in the Global Aluminium Industry This chapter examines China’s remarkable transformation into a global leader in the aluminium industry, a sector in which the country accounted for approximately 58.9% of worldwide production in 2022. We examine how China, a latecomer to the aluminium industry that started off with labor-intensive technology in 1953, grew into the largest aluminium producer with some of the most advanced smelters in the world. This analysis identifies and discusses several opportunities that Chinese aluminium producers took advantage of. The first set of opportunities happened during the 1970s oil crises, which softened international competition and allowed China to acquire innovative smelting technology from Japan. The second set of opportunities started at about the same time when China opened its economy in 1978. The substantial demand for aluminium in China is influenced by both external and internal factors. Externally, the US granted China’s MFN tariff status in 1980 and China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Both events contributed to a surge in Chinese aluminium consumption. Internally, China’s investment-led growth model boosted further its aluminium demand. Additional factors specific to China, such as low labor costs and the abundance of coal as an energy source, offer Chinese firms competitive advantages against international players. Furthermore, another window of opportunity is due to Chinese governmental policies, including phasing out old technology, providing subsidies, and gradually opening the economy to enhance domestic competition before expanding globally. By describing these elements, the study provides insights into the dynamic interplay of external circumstances and internal strategies that contributed to the success of the Chinese aluminium industry. Chapter 2: Technological Change and Strategic Choices for Incumbent and New Entrant This chapter introduces an oligopoly model that includes two actors: an incumbent and a potential entrant, that compete in the same market. We assume that two participants are located in different parts of the market: the incumbent is situated in area 1, whereas the potential entrant may venture into the other region, area 2. The incumbent exists in stage zero, where it can decide whether to deter the newcomer’s entry. A new type of technology exists in period one, when the newcomer may enter the market. In the short term, the incumbent is trapped with the outdated technology, while the new entrant may choose to partially or completely adopt the latest technology. Our results suggest the following: Firstly, the incumbent only tries to deter the new entrant if a condition for entry cost is met. Secondly, the new entrant is only interested in forming a cartel with the incumbent if a function of the ratio of the variable to new technology’s fixed-cost parameters is sufficiently high. Thirdly, if the newcomer asks to form a cartel, the incumbent will always accept this request. Finally, we can obtain the optimal new technology adoption rate for the newcomer. Chapter 3: Technological Adoption and Welfare in Cournot Oligopoly This study examines the difference between the optimal technology adoption rates chosen by firms in a homogeneous Cournot oligopoly and that preferred by a benevolent government upon firms’ market entry. To address the question of whether the technology choices of firms and government are similar, we analyze several different scenarios, which differ in the extent of government intervention in the market. Our results suggest a relationship between the number of firms in the market and the impact of government intervention on technology adoption rates. Especially in situations with a low number of firms that are interested in entering the market, greater government influence tends to lead to higher technology adoption rates of firms. Conversely, in scenarios with a higher number of firms and a government that lacks control over the number of market players, the technology adoption rate of firms will be highest when the government plays no role. Chapter 4: International Technological Innovation and Industrial Strategies Supporting domestic firms when they first enter the market may be seen as a favorable policy choice by governments around the world thanks to their ability to enhance the competitive advantage of domestic firms in non-cooperative competition against foreign enterprises (infant industry protection argument). This advantage may allow domestic firms to increase their market share and generate higher profits, thereby improving domestic welfare. This chapter utilizes the Spencer and Brander (1983) framework as a theoretical foundation to elucidate the effects of fixed-cost subsidies on firms’ production levels, technological innovations, and social welfare. The analysis examines two firms in different countries, each producing a homogeneous product that is sold in a third, separate country. We first examine the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the absence of government intervention, followed by analyzing a scenario where just one government provides a financial subsidy for its domestic firm, and finally, we consider a situation where both governments simultaneously provide financial assistance for their respective firms. Our results suggest that governments aim to maximize social welfare by providing fixed-cost subsidies to their respective firms, finding themselves in a Chicken game scenario. Regarding technology innovation, subsidies lead to an increased technological adoption rate for recipient firms, regardless of whether one or both firms in a market receive support, compared to the situation without subsidies. The technology adoption rate of the recipient firm is higher than of its rival when only the recipient firm benefits from the fixed-cost subsidy. The lowest technology adoption rate of a firm occurs when the firm does not receive a fixed-cost subsidy, but its competitor does. Furthermore, global welfare will benefit the most in case when both exporting countries grant fixed-cost subsidies, and this welfare level is higher when only one country subsidizes than when no subsidies are provided by any country.