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The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has had a significant impact on China in political, economic, and cultural terms. This study focuses on the cultural domain, especially on scholarship students from the countries that signed bilateral cooperation agreements with China under the BRI. Using an integrated approach combining the difference-in-differences method and the gravity model, we explore the correlation between the BRI and the increasing number of international scholarship students funded by the Chinese government, as well as the determinants of students' decision to study in China. The panel data from 2010 to 2018 show that the launch of BRI has had a positive impact on the number of scholarship students from BRI countries. The number of scholarship recipients from non-BRI countries also increased, but at a much slower rate than those from BRI countries. The sole exception is the United States, which has trended downward for both state-funded and self-funded students.
The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has also led to many conspiracy theories. While the origin of the pandemic in China led some, including former US president Donald Trump, to dub the pathogen “Chinese virus” and to support anti-Chinese conspiracy narratives, it caused Chinese state officials to openly support anti-US conspiracy theories about the “true” origin of the virus. In this article, we study whether nationalism, or more precisely uncritical patriotism, is related to belief in conspiracy theories among normal people. We hypothesize based on group identity theory and motivated reasoning that for the particular case of conspiracy theories related to the origin of COVID-19, such a relation should be stronger for Chinese than for Germans. To test this hypothesis, we use survey data from Germany and China, including data from the Chinese community in Germany. We also look at relations to other factors, in particular media consumption and xenophobia.
Despite significant advances in terms of the adoption of formal Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection, enforcement of and compliance with IPR regulations remains a contested issue in one of the world's major contemporary economies—China. The present review seeks to offer insights into possible reasons for this discrepancy as well as possible paths of future development by reviewing prior literature on IPR in China. Specifically, it focuses on the public's perspective, which is a crucial determinant of the effectiveness of any IPR regime. It uncovers possible differences with public perspectives in other countries and points to mechanisms (e.g., political, economic, cultural, and institutional) that may foster transitions over time in both formal IPR regulation and in the public perception of and compliance with IPR in China. On this basis, the review advances suggestions for future research in order to improve scholars' understanding of the public's perspective of IPR in China, its antecedents and implications.
We study planned changes in protective routines after the COVID-19 pandemic: in a survey in Germany among >650 respondents, we find that the majority plans to use face masks in certain situations even after the end of the pandemic. We observe that this willingness is strongly related to the perception that there is something to be learned from East Asians’ handling of pandemics, even when controlling for perceived protection by wearing masks. Given strong empirical evidence that face masks help prevent the spread of respiratory diseases and given the considerable estimated health and economic costs of such diseases even pre-Corona, this would be a very positive side effect of the current crisis.
ASEAN and ASEAN Plus Three: Manifestations of Collective Identities in Southeast and East Asia?
(2003)
East Asia is a region undergoing vast structural changes. As the region moved closer together economically and politically following the breakdown of the bipolar world order and the ensuing expansion of intra-regional interdependencies, the states of the region faced the challenge of having to actively recast their mutual relations. At the same time, throughout the 1990s, the West became increasingly interested in trans- and inter-regional dialogue and cooperation with the emerging economies of East Asia. These developments gave rise to a "new regionalism", which eventually also triggered debates on Asian identities and the region's potential to integrate. Before this backdrop, this thesis analyzes in how far both the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has been operative since 1967 and thus embodies the "old regionalism" of Southeast Asia, and the ASEAN Plus Three forum (APT: the ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea), which has come into existence in the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis of 1997, can be said to represent intergovernmental manifestations of specific collective identities in Southeast and East Asia, respectively. Based on profiles of the respective discursive, behavioral and motivational patterns as well as the integrative potential of ASEAN and APT, this study establishes in how far the member states adhere to sustainable collective patterns of interaction, expectations and objectives, and assesses in how far they can be said to form specific 'ingroups'. Four studies on collective norms, readiness to pool sovereignty, solidarity and attitudes vis-Ã -vis relevant third states show that ASEAN has evolved a certain degree of collective identity, though the Association's political relevance and coherence is frequently thwarted by changes in its external environment. A study on the cooperative and integrative potential of APT yields no manifest evidence of an ongoing or incipient pan-East Asian identity formation process.
Building Fortress Europe Economic realism, China, and Europe’s investment screening mechanisms
(2023)
This thesis deals with the construction of investment screening mechanisms across the major economic powers in Europe and at the supranational level during the post-2015 period. The core puzzle at the heart of this research is how, in a traditional bastion of economic liberalism such as Europe, could a protectionist tool such as investment screening be erected in such a rapid manner. Within a few years, Europe went from a position of being highly welcoming towards foreign investment to increasingly implementing controls on it, with the focus on China. How are we to understand this shift in Europe? I posit that Europe’s increasingly protectionist shift on inward investment can be fruitfully understood using an economic realist approach, where the introduction of investment screening can be seen as part of a process of ‘balancing’ China’s economic rise and reasserting European competitiveness. China has moved from being the ‘workshop of the world’ to becoming an innovation-driven economy at the global technological frontier. As China has become more competitive, Europe, still a global economic leader, broadly situated at the technological frontier, has begun to sense a threat to its position, especially in the context of the fourth industrial revolution. A ‘balancing’ process has been set in motion, in which Europe seeks to halt and even reverse the narrowing competitiveness gap between it and China. The introduction of investment screening measures is part of this process.