This dissertation focuses on the link between labour market institutions and precautionary savings. It is evaluated whether private households react to changes in social insurance provision such as the income replacement in case of unemployment by increased savings for precautionary reasons. The dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters, each focusing on slightly different aspects of the topic. The first chapter titled "Precautionary saving and the (in)stability of subjective earnings uncertainty" empirically looks at the influence of future income uncertainty on household saving behavior. Numerous cross-section studies on precautionary saving use subjective expectations regarding the income variance one year ahead as a proxy for income uncertainty. Using such proxies observed only at one point in time, however, may give rise to biased estimates for precautionary wealth if expectations are not stable over time. Survey data from the Dutch DNB Household Survey suggest that subjective future income distributions are not stable over the mid-term. Moreover, in this study I contrast estimates of precautionary wealth using the variation coefficient observed at one point in time with those using a simple mid-term average. Estimates of precautionary wealth based on the average are about 40% to 80% higher than the estimates using the variation coefficient observed only once. In addition to that, wealth accumulation for precautionary reasons is estimated for different parts of the income distribution. The share of precautionary wealth is highest for households at the center of the income distribution. By linking saving behaviour with unemployment insurance, the following chapters then shed some light on an issue that has largely been neglected in the literature on labour market institutions so far. Whereas the third chapter models the relevance of unemployment insurance for income uncertainty and intertemporal decision making during institutional reform processes, chapter 4 seeks to establish empirically a relationship between saving behavior and unemployment insurance. Social insurance, especially unemployment insurance, provides agents with income insurance against not marketable income risks. Since the early 1990s, reform measures like more activating policies as suggested by the OECD Jobs Study in 1994 have been observed in Europe. In the third chapter it is argued that such changes in unemployment insurance reduce public insurance and increase income uncertainty. Moreover, a simple three period model is discussed which shows a link between a welfare state reform and agents' saving decisions as one possible reaction of agents to self-insure against income risk. Two sources of uncertainty seem to be important in this context: (1) uncertain results of the reform process concerning the replacement rate, and (2) uncertainty regarding the timing of information about the content of the reform. It can be shown that the precautionary motive for saving explains an increased accumulation of capital in times of reform activities. In addition to that, early information about the expected replacement rate increases agents' utility and reduces under and oversaving. Following the argument of the previous chapters, that an important feature of labour market institutions in modern welfare states is to provide cash transfers as income replacement in case of unemployment, it is hypothesised that unemployment benefits reduce the motive to save for precautionary reasons. Based on consumer sentiment data from the European Commission's Consumer Survey, chapter four finally provides some evidence that aggregate saving intentions are significantly influenced by unemployment benefits. It can be shown that higher benefits lower the intention to save.