In Hegel’s “Lectures on Aesthetics”, poetry bears special relevance to the thesis of the spiritualization of art, the way of the medium from stone to word. The theoretical basis for this thesis rests on Hegel’s epistemic concept of intuition (Anschauung), representation (Vorstellung), and concept (Begriff ), as well as the components developed in this context for a modern semiology – a philosophical theory of signs and language. Poetry is considered as the most general, most comprehensive, and most spiritual art. A new kind of self-relation is constituted: imagination is related to imagination, representation to representation. Hegel unfolds a gradation from intuitive and imagining self-understanding – from art and religion – towards self-relational thought, a conceptual cognition of philosophy with its basis in the self-thinking thought (das Denken des Denkens). An intermingling of the forms of poetic and philosophical expression is to be avoided; crucial is a clean distinction between the forms of presentation proper to literature and to philosophy respectively, between the “army of metaphors” and the “phalanx of concepts” (Begriffe).

A diachronic approach to the relationship between literature and philosophy since antiquity needs to include the field of rhetoric, regardless of whether it appears as a link or a disruption. This article discusses fundamental questions of rhetoric, philosophy, and poetics in the example of invisible characters and their moral qualities in antiquity and the mid-18th century. Plato’s mythical literary version of the Gyges legend in the “Republic” conceives of the invisible character as an illustration of the morally depraved nature of humans. In the following, I shall not trace this “Gyges problem” in the terms of influence studies but rather with an awareness of the ubiquity of ancient knowledge in philosophy and literature of the 18th century. I shall situate Adam Smith’s oft-discussed metaphor of the invisible hand in the context of his lectures on rhetoric, which were instrumental in founding the tradition of the Scottish New Rhetoric. I shall argue that invisibility forms a central element of Smith’s definition of character. The manifold implications of such a conception of invisible characters will then be illustrated using the example of Eliza Haywood’s “The Invisible Spy” (1755) and her conception of authorial ethos. Thus, the metaphor of invisibility proves itself to be of transhistorical relevance for the relationship between philosophy and literature, especially when they both turn to character – understood as fictional person, moral constitution, and the medium of the letter.

This paper takes up the topic explored by Wolfgang G. Müller in this volume and discusses the various forms in which Carneades’ thought experiment was conceptualized and employed in philosophy, science, and law, as well as literature and film of the 20th and 21st centuries. Of course, it will not be possible to address all instances – in particular in popular culture, where the dilemma raised by Carneades resurfaces in ever new metaphorizations – and I will have to focus on some theoretical aspects, a few practical cases, and a variety of patterns and motifs that emerge in literary works or films. In some variants, the elements of the thought experiment have changed to a certain degree, but the underlying dilemma is still clearly recognizable. Of particular importance in recent discussions is the so-called trolley problem and research into cognitive responses to the dilemma. A second approach can be found in evolutionary theory and the discussion of altruism and self-sacrifice, both of which do not seem to be compatible with the struggle for survival as described in Darwinism. In the realm of law, the case of Mary and Jodie Attard forced a court decision on whether a human being should be killed in order to save the life of the conjoined sibling: similarly, but on a different scale, controversial discussions following the aftermath of 9/11 have involved the question as to whether a plane with possibly hundreds of passengers should be shot down to prevent an even larger catastrophe. Each of these theoretical concepts and their very real considerations have had their impact on literature and cinema, and this paper offers a survey of the most important narrative patterns and examples.

This essay attempts to establish an ethics of literature, which, as distinct from earlier approaches, is transgenerically oriented in that it does not focus on narrative alone but on the three main literary genres of narrative, dramatic, and lyric art. It follows Wittgenstein’s much-quoted dictum that aesthetics and ethics are one. Its basic assumption is that ethics emerges in literature under the condition of aesthetic form. The much-discussed problem of the relation between philosophy and literature is found in the concept of the proposition, which, in Aristotle, who uses the term apophansis, means a statement, assertion, or predication. In philosophy, the proposition is, as Gottfried Gabriel emphasizes in his monograph on cognition (2015), an essential element within deductive processes of argumentation, contributing to proving a theoretical position or working out a theoretical position. In literature, propositions usually do not occur in extended argumentative contexts. They make a statement that may have a significant philosophical and specifically ethical impact and that may relate to the entire works concerned. Hence, the concept of propositionality makes it possible to relate and simultaneously differentiate the two great achievements of the human mind: philosophy and literature. In the essay’s analytic part attention is given to specific ethical dilemmas in Homer’s “Iliad” and Shakespeare’s “Hamlet”, the representation of evil in Shakespeare’s tragedies, narrative strategies for presenting ethical situations and events in nineteenth-century novels (Austen, Dickens, Trollope, Twain, Tolstoy), and the occurrence of ethical elements in lyric poetry. As far as the lyric genre is concerned, we take note of the paradoxical fact that even in the object poetry of Rilke and the imagists (Williams), an ethical aspect emerges. A common result of textual analysis is the recognition of propositional elements in all texts investigated.

It is Aristotle to whom we owe the first philosophical theory of poetic art fully extant from antiquity. He recognized the origin of art and poetry in man’s capacity for theory and his pleasure in it, for he considered imitation (mímēsis) as the beginning and basis of cognition. He understood imitation not as a mere act of copying but as the realization and re-implementation of a single person’s general disposition to act, which is to say his or her disposition to turn towards the world aiming to seek pleasure or to avoid pain. The poet’s task is to represent such a way of acting, real or fictitious, in some medium in a certain way. An orderly representation of this kind starts from an (again, real or fictitious) person’s decision to prefer or avoid something. It closely follows this agent’s ‘quality’ (poiótēs), which is to say his or her character. Thereby, the poet can achieve a congruence of all parts of the entire action with one another and with the whole. This is what, in Aristotle’s view, is the poet’s task. At the time of the reception of Aristotle’s “Poetics” around 1500 AD, the understanding of poetry was widely shaped by Horace and Cicero and hence had a strongly rhetorical character. For Horace, it is true, the poet ought to be an imitator, as well, even though an ‘erudite’ imitator. In Horace’s view, however, his knowledge regards the general manners of man. Therefore, the poet, gifted as such with ‘prophetic eye’ and ‘wisdom,’ has the ability to express this knowledge in vivid and concrete terms (communia proprie dicere). This knowledge, which men, parents, brothers, politicians, judges, military commanders, etc. use to act was considered to be learnable according to the rules of rhetoric, although it is only by the poet’s individual talent that it can become art. It was believed that what Aristotle had called the ‘probable’ could be equated with this skill based on acquired experience and genius. As a consequence of this reinterpretation, Aristotelian probability, which makes a certain man talk and act in a certain way in accordance with his character, changed into the probability of the course of the world. The order of the action was turned into the order of things as the object of imitation. The development of art and literature as well as of the aesthetic theories of the modern age was essentially influenced by the concept of an order of things and thus impedes access to the rationality of poetry envisioned by Aristotle.

Pastoral serves as a keyword when understanding Seamus Heaney’s literary production, both in terms of stylistic features and imagery. Although critical attention has focused on the connection between his pastoral works and contemporary Irish politics, the growth of ecocritical scholarship in the last few decades has made evident the importance of broadening such an analytical scope to relationships between humans and the environment while studying this genre. In this alignment, the present essay offers an ecocritical reading of some selected pastoral poems by Heaney, with a specific focus on his revival of the eclogue through the collection “Electric Light” (2001). Precisely, the poems “Virgil: Eclogue IX,” “Bann Valley Eclogue,” and “Glanmore Eclogue” will be read through the innovative perspective offered by the recent engagement of affect theory with ecocriticism: by doing so, I argue that Heaney’s poems can be understood as valuable nature narratives that stress the connectedness between the human and the nonhuman, while resonating with the urgencies posed by the current environmental crisis to re-think more ethical forms of relationships between them. Furthermore, through the lens of econarratology, attention will be paid to the ecological potentials expressed by the formal features of the eclogue: this observation considers, on the one hand, the notion of ‘relationality’ within the practice of the shepherds’ dialogue/singing and, on the other hand, how this literary form stresses the attachment between the human and the environment, both in the real world and in the storyworld. Hence, when exceeding a strictly politically oriented critical analysis of his work, Heaney’s eclogues become visible as compelling ecocritical accounts that favor investigating the role of (pastoral) literature in fostering critical discussions about human/nonhuman ethics as a way to respond to the challenges of the Anthropocene.

This paper investigates how and to what extent the literary genre of the idyll lives on as part of the ‘new nature poetry.’ Following a conceptual, historical, and generic classification of the idyll, Thomas Kling’s „geschrebertes idyll, für mike feser“ is read to show, on the one hand, how skillfully and knowledgeably he unpacks the tradition. He not only plays in extenso with the genre’s characteristic features but also, on the other hand, includes in his “allotment garden idyll,” which can be read as an early example of Anthropocene poetry, astute and sharp-tongued ecological, social, medial, and historical critique. Despite his critical sensitivity to socially relevant themes, however, Kling presents a decidedly patriarchal self image, which today’s readers would probably find less readily acceptable and which distinguishes him from the most recent contemporary poetry.

This article will examine how and to what extent the ancient tradition of the didactic poem exerts an influence on contemporary German nature poetry. It will focus in particular on Raoul Schrott’s „Tropen“ and Marion Poschmann’s „Geliehene Landschaften“, which, while different from each other, both offer clues to possible lines of influence. Although there is a long tradition of didascalic poems in the German literature of the Renaissance and of the Enlightenment, my point of reference will be the ancient didactic poem, as it was shaped by Lucretius in his “De rerum natura”, because of its masterful intertwining of knowledge and poetry and its wholly secular view of nature, creation, and evolution, as well as the fact that it stresses the idea that life is accidental. These are the aspects of ancient didactic poetry that I will investigate in the aforementioned German poets and works, with particular attention to the relationship between the knowledge of nature and the language of poetry. Both Schrott and Poschmann openly use the word ‚Lehrgedicht‘ [didactic poem] in order to define their poems, in which the didactic parts function as a knowledge of “nature after nature.” As a consequence, their poetry revolves around the impossibility of an all-encompassing explanation of the world and takes as its theme the rupture that divides human beings from nature in the modern age. Consciousness of the intrinsic constructedness of the way we experience nature is, on the other hand, a condition for both its aesthetic perception and scientific enquiry. At the center of both Schrott’s and Poschmann’s poetry collections, albeit in different ways and with different emphases, we thereby find an understanding of nature as a void that can only be approached (but never overcome) by means of language. Herein lies the main difference between these contemporary poets and the ancient tradition.

This essay puts forth a definition of poetry rooted in experience. In following Eugenio Montale, it analyzes two of his poems – “I limoni” and “Notizie dall’Amiata” – to show how the poet, rather than constructing discrete poetic worlds, aims at a poetry revealing the world and nature to a concrete reader, unforeseeable for the poet. Poetry thus aims at imbuing this reader’s life with an ephemeral poetic form, rather than evoking its own self-sufficient aesthetics. In doing so, chance and flaws in the social and cultural construction of reality act as co-authors of his “poesia”.

Nicolaus Cusanus presents a subtle theory of alterity. We will show why Cusanus does not consistently assign humans a position superior to other living beings, even when strong anthropocentric arguments seem to be present. Kazuhiko Yamaki (2017: 280), e.g., has recently pointed out that the attribution of a privileged position to humans in the world already fails logically, because the complicatio-explicatio scheme applies to all creatures. I would like to follow up on Yamaki’s argument that Cusanus at this point is rather concerned with describing a specific relationship between God and the creatures or the world. If this argument is extended to the question of humans and animals in Cusanus as a whole, the way in which these relations are to be figured becomes the focus of consideration. Just as Cusanus, in cosmology and anthropology, examines the perspectivity of knowledge and the decentralization of the Earth (as a noble star among other stars) without falling into pure perspectivism or decentralism, so traits of this reflective and (figuratively) ‘living’ thinking must also apply to the description of the relationship of living beings to one another or in relation to their Creator.