For a long time it was believed that monetary policy would be able to maintain price stability and foster economic growth during all phases of the business cycle. The era of the Great Moderation, often also called the Volcker-Greenspan period, beginning in the mid 1980s was characterized by a decline in volatility of output growth and inflation among the industrialized countries. The term itself is first used by Stock and Watson (2003). Economist have long studied what triggered the decline in volatility and pointed out several main factors. An important research strand points out structural changes in the economy, such as a decline of volatility in the goods producing sector through better inventory controls and developments in the financial sector and government spending (McConnell2000, Blanchard2001, Stock2003, Kim2004, Davis2008). While many believed that monetary policy was only 'lucky' in terms of their reaction towards inflation and exogenous shocks (Stock2003, Primiceri2005, Sims2006, Gambetti2008), others reveal a more complex picture of the story. Rule based monetary policy (Taylor1993) that incorporates inflation targeting (Svensson1999) has been identified as a major source of inflation stabilization by increasing transparency (Clarida2000, Davis2008, Benati2009, Coibion2011). Apart from that, the mechanics of monetary policy transmission have changed. Giannone et al. (2008) compare the pre-Great Moderation era with the Great Modertation and find that the economies reaction towards monetary shocks has decreased. This finding is supported by Boivin et al. (2011). Similar to this, Herrera and Pesavento (2009) show that monetary policy during the Volcker-Greenspan period was very effective in dampening the effects of exogenous oil price shocks on the economy, while this cannot be found for the period thereafter. Yet, the subprime crisis unexpectedly hit worldwide economies and ended the era of Great Moderation. Financial deregulation and innovation has given banks opportunities for excessive risk taking, weakened financial stability (Crotty2009, Calomiris2009) and led to the build-up of credit-driven asset price bubbles (SchularickTaylor2012). The Federal Reserve (FED), that was thought to be the omnipotent conductor of price stability and economic growth during the Great Moderation, failed at preventing a harsh crisis. Even more, it did intensify the bubble with low interest rates following the Dotcom crisis of the early 2000s and misjudged the impact of its interventions (Taylor2009, Obstfeld2009). New results give a more detailed explanation on the question of latitude for monetary policy raised by Bernanke and suggest the existence of non-linearities in the transmission of monetary policy. Weise (1999), Garcia and Schaller (2002), Lo and Piger (2005), Mishkin (2009), Neuenkirch (2013) and Jannsen et al. (2015) find that monetary policy is more potent during times of financial distress and recessions. Its effectiveness during 'normal times' is much weaker or even insignificant. This prompts the question if these non-linearities limit central banks ability to lean against bubbles and financial imbalances (White2009, Walsh2009, Boivin2010, Mishkin2011).