This thesis consists of four highly related chapters examining China’s rise in the aluminium industry. The first chapter addresses the conditions that allowed China, which first entered the market in the 1950s, to rise to world leadership in aluminium production. Although China was a latecomer, its re-entry into the market after the oil crises in the 1970s was a success and led to its ascent as the world’s largest aluminium producer by 2001. With an estimated production of 40.4 million tonnes in 2022, China represented almost 60% of the global output. Chapter 1 examines the factors underlying this success, such as the decline of international aluminium cartels, the introduction of innovative technology, the US granting China the MFN tariff status, Chinese-specific factors, and supportive government policies. Chapter 2 develops a mathematical model to analyze firms’ decisions in the short term. It examines how an incumbent with outdated technology and a new entrant with access to a new type of technology make strategic decisions, including the incumbent’s decision whether to deter entry, the production choice of firms, the optimal technology adoption rate of the newcomer, and cartel formation. Chapter 3 focuses on the adoption of new technology by firms upon market entry in four scenarios: firstly, a free market Cournot competition; secondly, a situation in which the government determines technology adoption rates; thirdly, a scenario in which the government controls both technology and production; and finally, a scenario where the government dictates technology adoption rates, production levels, and also the number of market participants. Chapter 4 applies the Spencer and Brander (1983) framework to examine strategic industrial policy. The model assumes that there are two exporting firms in two different countries that sell a product to a third country. We examine how the domestic firm is influenced by government intervention, such as the provision of a fixed-cost subsidy to improve its competitiveness relative to the foreign company. Chapter 4 initially investigates a scenario where only one government offers a fixed-cost subsidy, followed by an analysis of the case when both governments simultaneously provide financial help. Taken together, these chapters provide a comprehensive analysis of the strategic, technological, and political factors contributing to China’s leadership in the global aluminium industry. Chapter 1: The Rise of China as a Latecomer in the Global Aluminium Industry This chapter examines China’s remarkable transformation into a global leader in the aluminium industry, a sector in which the country accounted for approximately 58.9% of worldwide production in 2022. We examine how China, a latecomer to the aluminium industry that started off with labor-intensive technology in 1953, grew into the largest aluminium producer with some of the most advanced smelters in the world. This analysis identifies and discusses several opportunities that Chinese aluminium producers took advantage of. The first set of opportunities happened during the 1970s oil crises, which softened international competition and allowed China to acquire innovative smelting technology from Japan. The second set of opportunities started at about the same time when China opened its economy in 1978. The substantial demand for aluminium in China is influenced by both external and internal factors. Externally, the US granted China’s MFN tariff status in 1980 and China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Both events contributed to a surge in Chinese aluminium consumption. Internally, China’s investment-led growth model boosted further its aluminium demand. Additional factors specific to China, such as low labor costs and the abundance of coal as an energy source, offer Chinese firms competitive advantages against international players. Furthermore, another window of opportunity is due to Chinese governmental policies, including phasing out old technology, providing subsidies, and gradually opening the economy to enhance domestic competition before expanding globally. By describing these elements, the study provides insights into the dynamic interplay of external circumstances and internal strategies that contributed to the success of the Chinese aluminium industry. Chapter 2: Technological Change and Strategic Choices for Incumbent and New Entrant This chapter introduces an oligopoly model that includes two actors: an incumbent and a potential entrant, that compete in the same market. We assume that two participants are located in different parts of the market: the incumbent is situated in area 1, whereas the potential entrant may venture into the other region, area 2. The incumbent exists in stage zero, where it can decide whether to deter the newcomer’s entry. A new type of technology exists in period one, when the newcomer may enter the market. In the short term, the incumbent is trapped with the outdated technology, while the new entrant may choose to partially or completely adopt the latest technology. Our results suggest the following: Firstly, the incumbent only tries to deter the new entrant if a condition for entry cost is met. Secondly, the new entrant is only interested in forming a cartel with the incumbent if a function of the ratio of the variable to new technology’s fixed-cost parameters is sufficiently high. Thirdly, if the newcomer asks to form a cartel, the incumbent will always accept this request. Finally, we can obtain the optimal new technology adoption rate for the newcomer. Chapter 3: Technological Adoption and Welfare in Cournot Oligopoly This study examines the difference between the optimal technology adoption rates chosen by firms in a homogeneous Cournot oligopoly and that preferred by a benevolent government upon firms’ market entry. To address the question of whether the technology choices of firms and government are similar, we analyze several different scenarios, which differ in the extent of government intervention in the market. Our results suggest a relationship between the number of firms in the market and the impact of government intervention on technology adoption rates. Especially in situations with a low number of firms that are interested in entering the market, greater government influence tends to lead to higher technology adoption rates of firms. Conversely, in scenarios with a higher number of firms and a government that lacks control over the number of market players, the technology adoption rate of firms will be highest when the government plays no role. Chapter 4: International Technological Innovation and Industrial Strategies Supporting domestic firms when they first enter the market may be seen as a favorable policy choice by governments around the world thanks to their ability to enhance the competitive advantage of domestic firms in non-cooperative competition against foreign enterprises (infant industry protection argument). This advantage may allow domestic firms to increase their market share and generate higher profits, thereby improving domestic welfare. This chapter utilizes the Spencer and Brander (1983) framework as a theoretical foundation to elucidate the effects of fixed-cost subsidies on firms’ production levels, technological innovations, and social welfare. The analysis examines two firms in different countries, each producing a homogeneous product that is sold in a third, separate country. We first examine the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the absence of government intervention, followed by analyzing a scenario where just one government provides a financial subsidy for its domestic firm, and finally, we consider a situation where both governments simultaneously provide financial assistance for their respective firms. Our results suggest that governments aim to maximize social welfare by providing fixed-cost subsidies to their respective firms, finding themselves in a Chicken game scenario. Regarding technology innovation, subsidies lead to an increased technological adoption rate for recipient firms, regardless of whether one or both firms in a market receive support, compared to the situation without subsidies. The technology adoption rate of the recipient firm is higher than of its rival when only the recipient firm benefits from the fixed-cost subsidy. The lowest technology adoption rate of a firm occurs when the firm does not receive a fixed-cost subsidy, but its competitor does. Furthermore, global welfare will benefit the most in case when both exporting countries grant fixed-cost subsidies, and this welfare level is higher when only one country subsidizes than when no subsidies are provided by any country.

Differential equations yield solutions that necessarily contain a certain amount of regularity and are based on local interactions. There are various natural phenomena that are not well described by local models. An important class of models that describe long-range interactions are the so-called nonlocal models, which are the subject of this work. The nonlocal operators considered here are integral operators with a finite range of interaction and the resulting models can be applied to anomalous diffusion, mechanics and multiscale problems. While the range of applications is vast, the applicability of nonlocal models can face problems such as the high computational and algorithmic complexity of fundamental tasks. One of them is the assembly of finite element discretizations of truncated, nonlocal operators. The first contribution of this thesis is therefore an openly accessible, documented Python code which allows to compute finite element approximations for nonlocal convection-diffusion problems with truncated interaction horizon. Another difficulty in the solution of nonlocal problems is that the discrete systems may be ill-conditioned which complicates the application of iterative solvers. Thus, the second contribution of this work is the construction and study of a domain decomposition type solver that is inspired by substructuring methods for differential equations. The numerical results are based on the abstract framework of nonlocal subdivisions which is introduced here and which can serve as a guideline for general nonlocal domain decomposition methods.

Sozialunternehmen haben mindestens zwei Ziele: die Erfüllung ihrer sozialen bzw. ökologischen Mission und finanzielle Ziele. Zwischen diesen Zielen können Spannungen entstehen. Wenn sie sich in diesem Spannungsfeld wiederholt zugunsten der finanziellen Ziele entscheiden, kommt es zum Mission Drift. Die Priorisierung der finanziellen Ziele überlagert dabei die soziale Mission. Auch wenn das Phänomen in der Praxis mehrfach beobachtet und in Einzelfallanalysen beschrieben wurde, gibt es bislang wenig Forschung zu Mission Drift. Der Fokus der vorliegenden Arbeit liegt darauf, diese Forschungslücke zu schließen und eigene Erkenntnisse für die Auslöser und Treiber des Mission Drifts von Sozialunternehmen zu ermitteln. Ein Augenmerk liegt auf den verhaltensökonomischen Theorien und der Mixed-Gamble-Logik. Dieser Logik zufolge liegt bei Entscheidungen immer eine Gleichzeitigkeit von Gewinnen und Verlusten vor, sodass Entscheidungsträger die Furcht vor Verlusten gegenüber der Aussicht auf Gewinne abwägen müssen. Das Modell wird genutzt, um eine neue theoretische Betrachtungsweise auf die Abwägung zwischen sozialen und finanziellen Zielen bzw. Mission Drift zu erhalten. Mit einem Conjoint Experiment werden Daten über das Entscheidungsverhalten von Sozialunternehmern generiert. Im Zentrum steht die Abwägung zwischen sozialen und finanziellen Zielen in verschiedenen Szenarien (Krisen- und Wachstumssituationen). Mithilfe einer eigens erstellten Stichprobe von 1.222 Sozialunternehmen aus Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz wurden 187 Teilnehmende für die Studie gewonnen. Die Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit zeigen, dass eine Krisensituation Auslöser für Mission Drift von Sozialunternehmen sein kann, weil in diesem Szenario den finanziellen Zielen die größte Bedeutung zugemessen wird. Für eine Wachstumssituation konnten hingegen keine solche Belege gefunden werden. Hinzu kommen weitere Einflussfaktoren, welche die finanzielle Orientierung verstärken können, nämlich die Gründeridentitäten der Sozialunternehmer, eine hohe Innovativität der Unternehmen und bestimmte Stakeholder. Die Arbeit schließt mit einer ausführlichen Diskussion der Ergebnisse. Es werden Empfehlungen gegeben, wie Sozialunternehmen ihren Zielen bestmöglich treu bleiben können. Außerdem werden die Limitationen der Studie und Wege für zukünftige Forschung im Bereich Mission Drift aufgezeigt.

Some of the largest firms in the DACH region (Germany, Austria, Switzerland) are (partially) owned by a foundation and/or a family office, such as Aldi, Bosch, or Rolex. Despite their growing importance, prior research neglected to analyze the impact of these intermediaries on the firms they own. This dissertation closes this research gap by contributing to a deeper understanding of two increasingly used family firm succession vehicles, through four empirical quantitative studies. The first study focuses on the heterogeneity in foundation-owned firms (FOFs) by applying a descriptive analysis to a sample of 169 German FOFs. The results indicate that the family as a central stakeholder in a family foundation fosters governance that promotes performance and growth. The second study examines the firm growth of 204 FOFs compared to matched non-FOFs from the DACH region. The findings suggest that FOFs grow significantly less in terms of sales but not with regard to employees. In addition, it seems that this negative effect is stronger for the upper than for the middle or lower quantiles of the growth distribution. Study three adopts an agency perspective and investigates the acquisition behavior within the group of 164 FOFs. The results reveal that firms with charitable foundations as owners are more likely to undertake acquisitions and acquire targets that are geographically and culturally more distant than firms with a family foundation as owner. At the same time, they favor target companies from the same or related industries. Finally, the fourth study scrutinizes the capital structure of firms owned by single family-offices (SFOs). Drawing on a hand-collected sample of 173 SFO-owned firms in the DACH region, the results show that SFO-owned firms display a higher long-term debt ratio than family-owned firms, indicating that SFO-owned firms follow trade-off theory, similar to private equity-owned firms. Additional analyses show that this effect is stronger for SFOs that sold their original family firm. In conclusion, the outcomes of this dissertation furnish valuable research contributions and offer practical insights for families navigating such intermediaries or succession vehicles in the long term.

Striving for sustainable development by combating climate change and creating a more social world is one of the most pressing issues of our time. Growing legal requirements and customer expectations require also Mittelstand firms to address sustainability issues such as climate change. This dissertation contributes to a better understanding of sustainability in the Mittelstand context by examining different Mittelstand actors and the three dimensions of sustainability - social, economic, and environmental sustainability - in four quantitative studies. The first two studies focus on the social relevance and economic performance of hidden champions, a niche market leading subgroup of Mittelstand firms. At the regional level, the impact of 1,645 hidden champions located in Germany on various dimensions of regional development is examined. A higher concentration of hidden champions has a positive effect on regional employment, median income, and patents. At the firm level, analyses of a panel dataset of 4,677 German manufacturing firms, including 617 hidden champions, show that the latter have a higher return on assets than other Mittelstand firms. The following two chapters deal with environmental strategies and thus contribute to the exploration of the environmental dimension of sustainability. First, the consideration of climate aspects in investment decisions is compared using survey data from 468 European venture capital and private equity investors. While private equity firms respond to external stakeholders and portfolio performance and pursue an active ownership strategy, venture capital firms are motivated by product differentiation and make impact investments. Finally, based on survey data from 443 medium-sized manufacturing firms in Germany, 54% of which are family-owned, the impact of stakeholder pressures on their decarbonization strategies is analyzed. A distinction is made between symbolic (compensation of CO₂-emissions) and substantive decarbonization strategies (reduction of CO₂-emissions). Stakeholder pressures lead to a proactive pursuit of decarbonization strategies, with internal and external stakeholders varying in their influence on symbolic and substantial decarbonization strategies, and the relationship influenced by family ownership.