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Due to the transition towards climate neutrality, energy markets are rapidly evolving. New technologies are developed that allow electricity from renewable energy sources to be stored or to be converted into other energy commodities. As a consequence, new players enter the markets and existing players gain more importance. Market equilibrium problems are capable of capturing these changes and therefore enable us to answer contemporary research questions with regard to energy market design and climate policy.
This cumulative dissertation is devoted to the study of different market equilibrium problems that address such emerging aspects in liberalized energy markets. In the first part, we review a well-studied competitive equilibrium model for energy commodity markets and extend this model by sector coupling, by temporal coupling, and by a more detailed representation of physical laws and technical requirements. Moreover, we summarize our main contributions of the last years with respect to analyzing the market equilibria of the resulting equilibrium problems.
For the extension regarding sector coupling, we derive sufficient conditions for ensuring uniqueness of the short-run equilibrium a priori and for verifying uniqueness of the long-run equilibrium a posteriori. Furthermore, we present illustrative examples that each of the derived conditions is indeed necessary to guarantee uniqueness in general.
For the extension regarding temporal coupling, we provide sufficient conditions for ensuring uniqueness of demand and production a priori. These conditions also imply uniqueness of the short-run equilibrium in case of a single storage operator. However, in case of multiple storage operators, examples illustrate that charging and discharging decisions are not unique in general. We conclude the equilibrium analysis with an a posteriori criterion for verifying uniqueness of a given short-run equilibrium. Since the computation of equilibria is much more challenging due to the temporal coupling, we shortly review why a tailored parallel and distributed alternating direction method of multipliers enables to efficiently compute market equilibria.
For the extension regarding physical laws and technical requirements, we show that, in nonconvex settings, existence of an equilibrium is not guaranteed and that the fundamental welfare theorems therefore fail to hold. In addition, we argue that the welfare theorems can be re-established in a market design in which the system operator is committed to a welfare objective. For the case of a profit-maximizing system operator, we propose an algorithm that indicates existence of an equilibrium and that computes an equilibrium in the case of existence. Based on well-known instances from the literature on the gas and electricity sector, we demonstrate the broad applicability of our algorithm. Our computational results suggest that an equilibrium often exists for an application involving nonconvex but continuous stationary gas physics. In turn, integralities introduced due to the switchability of DC lines in DC electricity networks lead to many instances without an equilibrium. Finally, we state sufficient conditions under which the gas application has a unique equilibrium and the line switching application has finitely many.
In the second part, all preprints belonging to this cumulative dissertation are provided. These preprints, as well as two journal articles to which the author of this thesis contributed, are referenced within the extended summary in the first part and contain more details.
This paper mainly studies two topics: linear complementarity problems for modeling electricity market equilibria and optimization under uncertainty. We consider both perfectly competitive and Nash–Cournot models of electricity markets and study their robustifications using strict robustness and the -approach. For three out of the four combinations of economic competition and robustification, we derive algorithmically tractable convex optimization counterparts that have a clear-cut economic interpretation. In the case of perfect competition, this result corresponds to the two classic welfare theorems, which also apply in both considered robust cases that again yield convex robustified problems. Using the mentioned counterparts, we can also prove the existence and, in some cases, uniqueness of robust equilibria. Surprisingly, it turns out that there is no such economic sensible counterpart for the case of -robustifications of Nash–Cournot models. Thus, an analog of the welfare theorems does not hold in this case. Finally, we provide a computational case study that illustrates the different effects of the combination of economic competition and uncertainty modeling.