Based on data collected from two surveys conducted in Germany and Taiwan, my first paper (Chapter 2) examines the impact of culture through language priming (Chinese vs. German or English) on individuals’ price fairness perception and attitudes towards government intervention and economic policy involving inequality. We document large cross-language differences: in both surveys, subjects who were asked and answered in Chinese demonstrated significantly higher perceived price fairness in a free market mechanism than their counterparts who completed the survey in German or English language. They were also more inclined to accept a Pareto improvement policy which increases social and economic inequality. In the second survey, Chinese language induced also a lower readiness to accept government intervention in markets with price limits compared to English language. Since language functions as a cultural mindset prime, our findings imply that culture plays an important role in fairness perception and preferences regarding social and economic inequality. Chapter 3 of this work deals with patriotism priming. By conducting two online experimental studies conducted in Germany and China, we tested three different kinds of priming methods for constructive and blind patriotism respectively. Subjects were randomly distributed to one of three treatments motivated by previous studies in different countries: a constructive patriotism priming treatment, a blind patriotism priming treatment and a non-priming baseline. While the first experiment had a between-subject design, the second one enabled both a between-subject and within-subject comparison, since the level of patriotism of individuals was measured before and after priming respectively. The design of the second survey also enabled a comparison among the three priming methods for constructive and blind patriotism. The results showed that the tested methods, especially the national achievements as a priming mechanism, functioned well overall for constructive patriotism. Surprisingly, the priming for blind patriotism did not work in either Germany or China and the opposite results were observed. Discussion and implications for future studies are provided at the end of the chapter. Using data from the same studies as in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 examines the impact of patriotism on individuals’ fairness perception and preferences regarding inequality and on their attitudes toward economic policy involving inequality. Across surveys and countries, a positive and significant effect of blind patriotism on economic individualism was found. For China, we also found a significant relationship between blind patriotism and the agreement to unequal economic policy. In contrast to blind patriotism, we did not find an association of constructive patriotism to economic individualism and to attitudes toward economic policy involving inequality. Political and economic implications based on the results are discussed. The last chapter (Chapter 5) studies the self-serving bias (when an individual’s perception about fairness is biased by self-interest) in the context of price setting and profit distribution. By analyzing data from four surveys conducted in six countries, we found that the stated appropriate product price and the fair allocation of profit was significantly higher, when the outcome was favorable to oneself. This self-serving bias in price fairness perception, however, differed across countries significantly and was significantly higher in Germany, Taiwan and China than in Vietnam, Estonia and Japan. Although economic individualism and masculinity were found to have a significant negative effect on self-interest bias in price fairness judgment, they did not sufficiently explain the differences in self-interest bias between countries. Furthermore, we also observed an increase of self-interest bias in profit allocation over time in time-series data for one country (Germany) with data from 2011 to 2023. The four papers are all co-authored with Prof. Marc Oliver Rieger, and the first paper has been accepted for publications in Review of Behavioral Economics.

　

In machine learning, classification is the task of predicting a label for each point within a data set. When the class of each point in the labeled subset is already known, this information is used to recognize patterns and make predictions about the points in the remainder of the set, referred to as the unlabeled set. This scenario falls in the field of supervised learning. However, the number of labeled points can be restricted, because, e.g., it is expensive to obtain this information. Besides, this subset may be biased, such as in the case of self-selection in a survey. Consequently, the classification performance for unlabeled points may be limited. To improve the reliability of the results, semi-supervised learning tackles the setting of labeled and unlabeled data. Moreover, in many cases, additional information about the size of each class can be available from undisclosed sources. This cumulative thesis presents different studies to combine this external cardinality constraint information within three important algorithms for binary classification in the supervised context: support vector machines (SVM), classification trees, and random forests. From a mathematical point of view, we focus on mixed-integer programming (MIP) models for semi-supervised approaches that consider a cardinality constraint for each class for each algorithm. Furthermore, since the proposed MIP models are computationally challenging, we also present techniques that simplify the process of solving these problems. In the SVM setting, we introduce a re-clustering method and further computational techniques to reduce the computational cost. In the context of classification trees, we provide correct values for certain bounds that play a crucial role for the solver performance. For the random forest model, we develop preprocessing techniques and an intuitive branching rule to reduce the solution time. For all three methods, our numerical results show that our approaches have better statistical performances for biased samples than the standard approach.

This thesis explores local and global normal and Edgeworth approximations for symmetric binomial distributions. Further, it examines the normal approximation of convolution powers of continuous and discrete uniform distributions. We obtain the optimal constant in the local central limit theorem for symmetric binomial distributions and its analogs in higher-order Edgeworth approximation. Further, we offer a novel proof for the known optimal constant in the global central limit theorem for symmetric binomial distributions using Fourier inversion. We also consider the effect of simple continuity correction in the global central limit theorem for symmetric binomial distributions. Here, and in higher-order Edgeworth approximation, we found optimal constants and asymptotically sharp bounds on the approximation error. Furthermore, we prove asymptotically sharp bounds on the error in the local case of a relative normal approximation to symmetric binomial distributions. Additionally, we provide asymptotically sharp bounds on the approximation error in the local central limit theorem for convolution powers of continuous and discrete uniform distributions. Our methods include Fourier inversion formulae, explicit inequalities, and Edgeworth expansions, some of which may be of independent interest.

This thesis consists of four highly related chapters examining China’s rise in the aluminium industry. The first chapter addresses the conditions that allowed China, which first entered the market in the 1950s, to rise to world leadership in aluminium production. Although China was a latecomer, its re-entry into the market after the oil crises in the 1970s was a success and led to its ascent as the world’s largest aluminium producer by 2001. With an estimated production of 40.4 million tonnes in 2022, China represented almost 60% of the global output. Chapter 1 examines the factors underlying this success, such as the decline of international aluminium cartels, the introduction of innovative technology, the US granting China the MFN tariff status, Chinese-specific factors, and supportive government policies. Chapter 2 develops a mathematical model to analyze firms’ decisions in the short term. It examines how an incumbent with outdated technology and a new entrant with access to a new type of technology make strategic decisions, including the incumbent’s decision whether to deter entry, the production choice of firms, the optimal technology adoption rate of the newcomer, and cartel formation. Chapter 3 focuses on the adoption of new technology by firms upon market entry in four scenarios: firstly, a free market Cournot competition; secondly, a situation in which the government determines technology adoption rates; thirdly, a scenario in which the government controls both technology and production; and finally, a scenario where the government dictates technology adoption rates, production levels, and also the number of market participants. Chapter 4 applies the Spencer and Brander (1983) framework to examine strategic industrial policy. The model assumes that there are two exporting firms in two different countries that sell a product to a third country. We examine how the domestic firm is influenced by government intervention, such as the provision of a fixed-cost subsidy to improve its competitiveness relative to the foreign company. Chapter 4 initially investigates a scenario where only one government offers a fixed-cost subsidy, followed by an analysis of the case when both governments simultaneously provide financial help. Taken together, these chapters provide a comprehensive analysis of the strategic, technological, and political factors contributing to China’s leadership in the global aluminium industry. Chapter 1: The Rise of China as a Latecomer in the Global Aluminium Industry This chapter examines China’s remarkable transformation into a global leader in the aluminium industry, a sector in which the country accounted for approximately 58.9% of worldwide production in 2022. We examine how China, a latecomer to the aluminium industry that started off with labor-intensive technology in 1953, grew into the largest aluminium producer with some of the most advanced smelters in the world. This analysis identifies and discusses several opportunities that Chinese aluminium producers took advantage of. The first set of opportunities happened during the 1970s oil crises, which softened international competition and allowed China to acquire innovative smelting technology from Japan. The second set of opportunities started at about the same time when China opened its economy in 1978. The substantial demand for aluminium in China is influenced by both external and internal factors. Externally, the US granted China’s MFN tariff status in 1980 and China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Both events contributed to a surge in Chinese aluminium consumption. Internally, China’s investment-led growth model boosted further its aluminium demand. Additional factors specific to China, such as low labor costs and the abundance of coal as an energy source, offer Chinese firms competitive advantages against international players. Furthermore, another window of opportunity is due to Chinese governmental policies, including phasing out old technology, providing subsidies, and gradually opening the economy to enhance domestic competition before expanding globally. By describing these elements, the study provides insights into the dynamic interplay of external circumstances and internal strategies that contributed to the success of the Chinese aluminium industry. Chapter 2: Technological Change and Strategic Choices for Incumbent and New Entrant This chapter introduces an oligopoly model that includes two actors: an incumbent and a potential entrant, that compete in the same market. We assume that two participants are located in different parts of the market: the incumbent is situated in area 1, whereas the potential entrant may venture into the other region, area 2. The incumbent exists in stage zero, where it can decide whether to deter the newcomer’s entry. A new type of technology exists in period one, when the newcomer may enter the market. In the short term, the incumbent is trapped with the outdated technology, while the new entrant may choose to partially or completely adopt the latest technology. Our results suggest the following: Firstly, the incumbent only tries to deter the new entrant if a condition for entry cost is met. Secondly, the new entrant is only interested in forming a cartel with the incumbent if a function of the ratio of the variable to new technology’s fixed-cost parameters is sufficiently high. Thirdly, if the newcomer asks to form a cartel, the incumbent will always accept this request. Finally, we can obtain the optimal new technology adoption rate for the newcomer. Chapter 3: Technological Adoption and Welfare in Cournot Oligopoly This study examines the difference between the optimal technology adoption rates chosen by firms in a homogeneous Cournot oligopoly and that preferred by a benevolent government upon firms’ market entry. To address the question of whether the technology choices of firms and government are similar, we analyze several different scenarios, which differ in the extent of government intervention in the market. Our results suggest a relationship between the number of firms in the market and the impact of government intervention on technology adoption rates. Especially in situations with a low number of firms that are interested in entering the market, greater government influence tends to lead to higher technology adoption rates of firms. Conversely, in scenarios with a higher number of firms and a government that lacks control over the number of market players, the technology adoption rate of firms will be highest when the government plays no role. Chapter 4: International Technological Innovation and Industrial Strategies Supporting domestic firms when they first enter the market may be seen as a favorable policy choice by governments around the world thanks to their ability to enhance the competitive advantage of domestic firms in non-cooperative competition against foreign enterprises (infant industry protection argument). This advantage may allow domestic firms to increase their market share and generate higher profits, thereby improving domestic welfare. This chapter utilizes the Spencer and Brander (1983) framework as a theoretical foundation to elucidate the effects of fixed-cost subsidies on firms’ production levels, technological innovations, and social welfare. The analysis examines two firms in different countries, each producing a homogeneous product that is sold in a third, separate country. We first examine the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the absence of government intervention, followed by analyzing a scenario where just one government provides a financial subsidy for its domestic firm, and finally, we consider a situation where both governments simultaneously provide financial assistance for their respective firms. Our results suggest that governments aim to maximize social welfare by providing fixed-cost subsidies to their respective firms, finding themselves in a Chicken game scenario. Regarding technology innovation, subsidies lead to an increased technological adoption rate for recipient firms, regardless of whether one or both firms in a market receive support, compared to the situation without subsidies. The technology adoption rate of the recipient firm is higher than of its rival when only the recipient firm benefits from the fixed-cost subsidy. The lowest technology adoption rate of a firm occurs when the firm does not receive a fixed-cost subsidy, but its competitor does. Furthermore, global welfare will benefit the most in case when both exporting countries grant fixed-cost subsidies, and this welfare level is higher when only one country subsidizes than when no subsidies are provided by any country.