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Teamwork is ubiquitous in the modern workplace. However, it is still unclear whether various behavioral economic factors de- or increase team performance. Therefore, Chapters 2 to 4 of this thesis aim to shed light on three research questions that address different determinants of team performance.
Chapter 2 investigates the idea of an honest workplace environment as a positive determinant of performance. In a work group, two out of three co-workers can obtain a bonus in a dice game. By misreporting a secret die roll, cheating without exposure is an option in the game. Contrary to claims on the importance of honesty at work, we do not observe a reduction in the third co-worker's performance, who is an uninvolved bystander when cheating takes place.
Chapter 3 analyzes the effect of team size on performance in a workplace environment in which either two or three individuals perform a real-effort task. Our main result shows that the difference in team size is not harmful to task performance on average. In our discussion of potential mechanisms, we provide evidence on ongoing peer effects. It appears that peers are able to alleviate the potential free-rider problem emerging out of working in a larger team.
In Chapter 4, the role of perceived co-worker attractiveness for performance is analyzed. The results show that task performance is lower, the higher the perceived attractiveness of co-workers, but only in opposite-sex constellations.
The following Chapter 5 analyzes the effect of offering an additional payment option in a fundraising context. Chapter 6 focuses on privacy concerns of research participants.
In Chapter 5, we conduct a field experiment in which, participants have the opportunity to donate for the continuation of an art exhibition by either cash or cash and an additional cashless payment option (CPO). The treatment manipulation is completed by framing the act of giving either as a donation or pay-what-you-want contribution. Our results show that donors shy away from using the CPO in all treatment conditions. Despite that, there is no negative effect of the CPO on the frequency of financial support and its magnitude.
In Chapter 6, I conduct an experiment to test whether increased transparency of data processing affects data disclosure and whether the results change if it is indicated that the implementation of the GDPR happened involuntarily. I find that increased transparency raises the number of participants who do not disclose personal data by 21 percent. However, this is not the case in the involuntary-signal treatment, where the share of non-disclosures is relatively high in both conditions.