330 Wirtschaft
External capital plays an important role in financing entrepreneurial ventures, due to limited internal capital sources. An important external capital provider for entrepreneurial ventures are venture capitalists (VCs). VCs worldwide are often confronted with thousands of proposals of entrepreneurial ventures per year and must choose among all of these companies in which to invest. Not only do VCs finance companies at their early stages, but they also finance entrepreneurial companies in their later stages, when companies have secured their first market success. That is why this dissertation focuses on the decision-making behavior of VCs when investing in later-stage ventures. This dissertation uses both qualitative as well as quantitative research methods in order to provide answer to how the decision-making behavior of VCs that invest in later-stage ventures can be described.
Based on qualitative interviews with 19 investment professionals, the first insight gained is that for different stages of venture development, different decision criteria are applied. This is attributed to different risks and goals of ventures at different stages, as well as the different types of information available. These decision criteria in the context of later-stage ventures contrast with results from studies that focus on early-stage ventures. Later-stage ventures possess meaningful information on financials (revenue growth and profitability), the established business model, and existing external investors that is not available for early-stage ventures and therefore constitute new decision criteria for this specific context.
Following this identification of the most relevant decision criteria for investors in the context of later-stage ventures, a conjoint study with 749 participants was carried out to understand the relative importance of decision criteria. The results showed that investors attribute the highest importance to 1) revenue growth, (2) value-added of products/services for customers, and (3) management team track record, demonstrating differences when compared to decision-making studies in the context of early-stage ventures.
Not only do the characteristics of a venture influence the decision to invest, additional indirect factors, such as individual characteristics or characteristics of the investment firm, can influence individual decisions. Relying on cognitive theory, this study investigated the influence of various individual characteristics on screening decisions and found that both investment experience and entrepreneurial experience have an influence on individual decision-making behavior. This study also examined whether goals, incentive structures, resources, and governance of the investment firm influence decision making in the context of later-stage ventures. This study particularly investigated two distinct types of investment firms, family offices and corporate venture capital funds (CVC), which have unique structures, goals, and incentive systems. Additional quantitative analysis showed that family offices put less focus on high-growth firms and whether reputable investors are present. They tend to focus more on the profitability of a later-stage venture in the initial screening. The analysis showed that CVCs place greater importance on product and business model characteristics than other investors. CVCs also favor later-stage ventures with lower revenue growth rates, indicating a preference for less risky investments. The results provide various insights for theory and practice.
This study examines to what extent a banking crisis and the ensuing potential liquidity shortage affect corporate cash holdings. Specifically, how do firms adjust their liquidity management prior to and during a banking crisis when they are restricted in their financing options? These restrictions might not result from firm-specific characteristics but also incorporate the effects of certain regulatory requirements. I analyse the real effects of indicators of a potential crisis and the occurrence of a crisis event on corporate cash holdings for both unregulated and regulated firms from 31 different countries. In contrast to existing studies, I perform this analysis on the basis of a long observation period (1997 to 2014 respectively 2003 to 2014) using multiple crisis indicators (early warning signals) and multiple crisis events. For regulated firms, this study makes use of a unique sample of country-specific regulatory information, which is collected by hand for 15 countries and converted into an ordinal scale based on the severity of the regulation. Regulated firms are selected from a single industry: Real Estate Investment Trusts. These firms invest in real estate properties and let these properties to third parties. Real Estate Investment Trusts that comply with the aforementioned regulations are exempt from income taxation and are punished for a breach, which makes this industry particularly interesting for the analysis of capital structure decisions.
The results for regulated and unregulated firms are mostly inconclusive. I find no convincing evidence that the degree of regulation affects the level of cash holdings for regulated firms before and during a banking crisis. For unregulated firms, I find strong evidence that financially constrained firms have higher cash holdings than unconstrained firms. Further, there is no real evidence that either financially constrained firms or unconstrained firms increase their cash holdings when observing an early warning signal. In case of a banking crisis, the results differ for univariate tests and in panel regressions. In the univariate setting, I find evidence that both types of firms hold higher levels of cash during a banking crisis. In panel regressions, the effect is only evident for financially unconstrained firms from the US, and when controlling for financial stress, it is also apparent for financially constrained US firms. For firms from Europe, the results are predominantly inconclusive. For banking crises that are preceded by an early warning signal, there is only evidence for an increase in cash holdings for unconstrained US firms when controlling for financial stress.