The gender wage gap in labor market outcomes has been intensively investigated for decades, yet it remains a relevant and innovative research topic in labor economics. Chapter 2 of this dissertation explores the pressing issue of gender wage disparity in Ethiopia. By applying various empirical methodologies and measures of occupational segregation, this chapter aims to analyze the role of female occupational segregation in explaining the gender wage gap across the pay distribution. The findings reveal a significant difference in monthly wages, with women consistently earning lower wages across the wage distribution. Importantly, the result indicates a negative association between female occupational segregation and the average earnings of both men and women. Furthermore, the estimation result shows that female occupational segregation partially explains the gender wage gap at the bottom of the wage distribution. I find that the magnitude of the gender wage gap in the private sector is higher than in the public sector. In Chapter 3, the Ethiopian Demography and Health Survey data are leveraged to explore the causal relationship between female labor force participation and domestic violence. Domestic violence against women is a pervasive public health concern, particularly in Africa, including Ethiopia, where a significant proportion of women endure various forms of domestic violence perpetrated by intimate partners. Economic empowerment of women through increased participation in the labor market can be one of the mechanisms for mitigating the risk of domestic violence. This study seeks to provide empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis. Using the employment rate of women at the community level as an instrumental variable, the finding suggests that employment significantly reduces the risk of domestic violence against women. More precisely, the result shows that women’s employment status significantly reduces domestic violence by about 15 percentage points. This finding is robust for different dimensions of domestic violence, such as physical, sexual, and emotional violence. By examining the employment outcomes of immigrants in the labor market, Chapter 4 extends the dissertation's inquiry to the dynamics of immigrant economic integration into the destination country. Drawing on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, the chapter scrutinizes the employment gap between native-born individuals and two distinct groups of first-generation immigrants: refugees and other migrants. Through rigorous analysis, Chapter 4 aims to identify the factors contributing to disparities in employment outcomes among these groups. In this chapter, I aim to disentangle the heterogeneity characteristic of refugees and other immigrants in the labor market, thereby contributing to a deeper understanding of immigrant labor market integration in Germany. The results show that refugees and other migrants are less likely to find employment than comparable natives. The refugee-native employment gap is much wider than other migrant-native employment gap. Moreover, the findings vary by gender and migration categories. While other migrant men do not differ from native men in the probability of being employed, refugee women are the most disadvantaged group compared to other migrant women and native women in the probability of being employed. The study suggests that German language proficiency and permanent resident permits partially explain the lower employment probability of refugees in the German labor market. Chapter 5 (co-authored with Uwe Jirjahn) utilizes the same dataset to explore the immigrant-native trade union membership gap, focusing on the role of integration in the workplace and into society. The integration of immigrants into society and the workplace is vital not only to improve migrant's performance in the labor market but also to actively participate in institutions such as trade unions. In this study, we argue that the incomplete integration of immigrants into the workplace and society implies that immigrants are less likely to be union members than natives. Our findings show that first-generation immigrants are less likely to be trade union members than natives. Notably, the analysis shows that the immigrant-native gap in union membership depends on immigrants’ integration into the workplace and society. The gap is smaller for immigrants working in firms with a works council and having social contacts with Germans. Moreover, the results reveal that the immigrant-native union membership gap is decreasing in the year since arrival in Germany.

This thesis deals with consumption-investment allocation problems with Epstein-Zin recursive utility, building upon the dualization procedure introduced by [Matoussi and Xing, 2018]. While their work exclusively focuses on truly recursive utility, we extend their procedure to include time-additive utility using results from general convex analysis. The dual problem is expressed in terms of a backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE), for which existence and uniqueness results are established. In this regard, we close a gap left open in previous works, by extending results restricted to specific subsets of parameters to cover all parameter constellations within our duality setting. Using duality theory, we analyze the utility loss of an investor with recursive preferences, that is, her difference in utility between acting suboptimally in a given market, compared to her best possible (optimal) consumption-investment behaviour. In particular, we derive universal power utility bounds, presenting a novel and tractable approximation of the investors’ optimal utility and her welfare loss associated to specific investment-consumption choices. To address quantitative shortcomings of those power utility bounds, we additionally introduce one-sided variational bounds that offer a more effective approximation for recursive utilities. The theoretical value of our power utility bounds is demonstrated through their application in a new existence and uniqueness result for the BSDE characterizing the dual problem. Moreover, we propose two approximation approaches for consumption-investment optimization problems with Epstein-Zin recursive preferences. The first approach directly formalizes the classical concept of least favorable completion, providing an analytic approximation fully characterized by a system of ordinary differential equations. In the special case of power utility, this approach can be interpreted as a variation of the well-known Campbell-Shiller approximation, improving some of its qualitative shortcomings with respect to state dependence of the resulting approximate strategies. The second approach introduces a PDE-iteration scheme, by reinterpreting artificial completion as a dynamic game, where the investor and a dual opponent interact until reaching an equilibrium that corresponds to an approximate solution of the investors optimization problem. Despite the need for additional approximations within each iteration, this scheme is shown to be quantitatively and qualitatively accurate. Moreover, it is capable of approximating high dimensional optimization problems, essentially avoiding the curse of dimensionality and providing analytical results.

In bilevel optimization, some of the variables of an optimization problem have to be an optimal solution to another nested optimization problem. This specific structure renders bilevel optimization a powerful tool for modeling hierarchical decision-making processes, which arise in various real-world applications such as in critical infrastructure defense, transportation, or energy. Due to their nested structure, however, bilevel problems are also inherently hard to solve—both in theory and in practice. Further challenges arise if, e.g., bilevel problems under uncertainty are considered. In this dissertation, we address different types of uncertainties in bilevel optimization using techniques from robust optimization. We study mixed-integer linear bilevel problems with lower-level objective uncertainty, which we tackle using the notion of Gamma-robustness. We present two exact branch-and-cut approaches to solve these Gamma-robust bilevel problems, along with cuts tailored to the important class of monotone interdiction problems. Given the overall hardness of the considered problems, we additionally propose heuristic approaches for mixed-integer, linear, and Gamma-robust bilevel problems. The latter rely on solving a linear number of deterministic bilevel problems so that no problem-specific tailoring is required. We assess the performance of both the exact and the heuristic approaches through extensive computational studies. In addition, we study the problem of determining optimal tolls in a traffic network in which the network users hedge against uncertain travel costs in a robust way. The overall toll-setting problem can be seen as a single-leader multi-follower problem with multiple robustified followers. We model this setting as a mathematical problem with equilibrium constraints, for which we present a mixed-integer, nonlinear, and nonconvex reformulation that can be tackled using state-of-the-art general-purpose solvers. We further illustrate the impact of considering robustified followers on the toll-setting policies through a case study. Finally, we highlight that the sources of uncertainty in bilevel optimization are much richer compared to single-level optimization. To this end, we study two aspects related to so-called decision uncertainty. First, we propose a strictly robust approach in which the follower hedges against erroneous observations of the leader's decision. Second, we consider an exemplary bilevel problem with a continuous but nonconvex lower level in which algorithmic necessities prevent the follower from making a globally optimal decision in an exact sense. The example illustrates that even very small deviations in the follower's decision may lead to arbitrarily large discrepancies between exact and computationally obtained bilevel solutions.

In machine learning, classification is the task of predicting a label for each point within a data set. When the class of each point in the labeled subset is already known, this information is used to recognize patterns and make predictions about the points in the remainder of the set, referred to as the unlabeled set. This scenario falls in the field of supervised learning. However, the number of labeled points can be restricted, because, e.g., it is expensive to obtain this information. Besides, this subset may be biased, such as in the case of self-selection in a survey. Consequently, the classification performance for unlabeled points may be limited. To improve the reliability of the results, semi-supervised learning tackles the setting of labeled and unlabeled data. Moreover, in many cases, additional information about the size of each class can be available from undisclosed sources. This cumulative thesis presents different studies to combine this external cardinality constraint information within three important algorithms for binary classification in the supervised context: support vector machines (SVM), classification trees, and random forests. From a mathematical point of view, we focus on mixed-integer programming (MIP) models for semi-supervised approaches that consider a cardinality constraint for each class for each algorithm. Furthermore, since the proposed MIP models are computationally challenging, we also present techniques that simplify the process of solving these problems. In the SVM setting, we introduce a re-clustering method and further computational techniques to reduce the computational cost. In the context of classification trees, we provide correct values for certain bounds that play a crucial role for the solver performance. For the random forest model, we develop preprocessing techniques and an intuitive branching rule to reduce the solution time. For all three methods, our numerical results show that our approaches have better statistical performances for biased samples than the standard approach.

This thesis consists of four highly related chapters examining China’s rise in the aluminium industry. The first chapter addresses the conditions that allowed China, which first entered the market in the 1950s, to rise to world leadership in aluminium production. Although China was a latecomer, its re-entry into the market after the oil crises in the 1970s was a success and led to its ascent as the world’s largest aluminium producer by 2001. With an estimated production of 40.4 million tonnes in 2022, China represented almost 60% of the global output. Chapter 1 examines the factors underlying this success, such as the decline of international aluminium cartels, the introduction of innovative technology, the US granting China the MFN tariff status, Chinese-specific factors, and supportive government policies. Chapter 2 develops a mathematical model to analyze firms’ decisions in the short term. It examines how an incumbent with outdated technology and a new entrant with access to a new type of technology make strategic decisions, including the incumbent’s decision whether to deter entry, the production choice of firms, the optimal technology adoption rate of the newcomer, and cartel formation. Chapter 3 focuses on the adoption of new technology by firms upon market entry in four scenarios: firstly, a free market Cournot competition; secondly, a situation in which the government determines technology adoption rates; thirdly, a scenario in which the government controls both technology and production; and finally, a scenario where the government dictates technology adoption rates, production levels, and also the number of market participants. Chapter 4 applies the Spencer and Brander (1983) framework to examine strategic industrial policy. The model assumes that there are two exporting firms in two different countries that sell a product to a third country. We examine how the domestic firm is influenced by government intervention, such as the provision of a fixed-cost subsidy to improve its competitiveness relative to the foreign company. Chapter 4 initially investigates a scenario where only one government offers a fixed-cost subsidy, followed by an analysis of the case when both governments simultaneously provide financial help. Taken together, these chapters provide a comprehensive analysis of the strategic, technological, and political factors contributing to China’s leadership in the global aluminium industry. Chapter 1: The Rise of China as a Latecomer in the Global Aluminium Industry This chapter examines China’s remarkable transformation into a global leader in the aluminium industry, a sector in which the country accounted for approximately 58.9% of worldwide production in 2022. We examine how China, a latecomer to the aluminium industry that started off with labor-intensive technology in 1953, grew into the largest aluminium producer with some of the most advanced smelters in the world. This analysis identifies and discusses several opportunities that Chinese aluminium producers took advantage of. The first set of opportunities happened during the 1970s oil crises, which softened international competition and allowed China to acquire innovative smelting technology from Japan. The second set of opportunities started at about the same time when China opened its economy in 1978. The substantial demand for aluminium in China is influenced by both external and internal factors. Externally, the US granted China’s MFN tariff status in 1980 and China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Both events contributed to a surge in Chinese aluminium consumption. Internally, China’s investment-led growth model boosted further its aluminium demand. Additional factors specific to China, such as low labor costs and the abundance of coal as an energy source, offer Chinese firms competitive advantages against international players. Furthermore, another window of opportunity is due to Chinese governmental policies, including phasing out old technology, providing subsidies, and gradually opening the economy to enhance domestic competition before expanding globally. By describing these elements, the study provides insights into the dynamic interplay of external circumstances and internal strategies that contributed to the success of the Chinese aluminium industry. Chapter 2: Technological Change and Strategic Choices for Incumbent and New Entrant This chapter introduces an oligopoly model that includes two actors: an incumbent and a potential entrant, that compete in the same market. We assume that two participants are located in different parts of the market: the incumbent is situated in area 1, whereas the potential entrant may venture into the other region, area 2. The incumbent exists in stage zero, where it can decide whether to deter the newcomer’s entry. A new type of technology exists in period one, when the newcomer may enter the market. In the short term, the incumbent is trapped with the outdated technology, while the new entrant may choose to partially or completely adopt the latest technology. Our results suggest the following: Firstly, the incumbent only tries to deter the new entrant if a condition for entry cost is met. Secondly, the new entrant is only interested in forming a cartel with the incumbent if a function of the ratio of the variable to new technology’s fixed-cost parameters is sufficiently high. Thirdly, if the newcomer asks to form a cartel, the incumbent will always accept this request. Finally, we can obtain the optimal new technology adoption rate for the newcomer. Chapter 3: Technological Adoption and Welfare in Cournot Oligopoly This study examines the difference between the optimal technology adoption rates chosen by firms in a homogeneous Cournot oligopoly and that preferred by a benevolent government upon firms’ market entry. To address the question of whether the technology choices of firms and government are similar, we analyze several different scenarios, which differ in the extent of government intervention in the market. Our results suggest a relationship between the number of firms in the market and the impact of government intervention on technology adoption rates. Especially in situations with a low number of firms that are interested in entering the market, greater government influence tends to lead to higher technology adoption rates of firms. Conversely, in scenarios with a higher number of firms and a government that lacks control over the number of market players, the technology adoption rate of firms will be highest when the government plays no role. Chapter 4: International Technological Innovation and Industrial Strategies Supporting domestic firms when they first enter the market may be seen as a favorable policy choice by governments around the world thanks to their ability to enhance the competitive advantage of domestic firms in non-cooperative competition against foreign enterprises (infant industry protection argument). This advantage may allow domestic firms to increase their market share and generate higher profits, thereby improving domestic welfare. This chapter utilizes the Spencer and Brander (1983) framework as a theoretical foundation to elucidate the effects of fixed-cost subsidies on firms’ production levels, technological innovations, and social welfare. The analysis examines two firms in different countries, each producing a homogeneous product that is sold in a third, separate country. We first examine the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the absence of government intervention, followed by analyzing a scenario where just one government provides a financial subsidy for its domestic firm, and finally, we consider a situation where both governments simultaneously provide financial assistance for their respective firms. Our results suggest that governments aim to maximize social welfare by providing fixed-cost subsidies to their respective firms, finding themselves in a Chicken game scenario. Regarding technology innovation, subsidies lead to an increased technological adoption rate for recipient firms, regardless of whether one or both firms in a market receive support, compared to the situation without subsidies. The technology adoption rate of the recipient firm is higher than of its rival when only the recipient firm benefits from the fixed-cost subsidy. The lowest technology adoption rate of a firm occurs when the firm does not receive a fixed-cost subsidy, but its competitor does. Furthermore, global welfare will benefit the most in case when both exporting countries grant fixed-cost subsidies, and this welfare level is higher when only one country subsidizes than when no subsidies are provided by any country.